30 éve szabadon Közép-Európában

30 éve szabadon Közép-Európában

Szerkesztette

Simon János

Budapest, 2022

Szerzők

Becsey Zsolt László

Biagini, Antonello

Bin Abedin Bhuiyan, Mohammad Farid

Bizberg, Ilán

Bogár László

Boros Imre

Carteny, Andrea

Colomer, Josep M.

Csath Magdolna

Csepeli György

Cservák Csaba

Domonkos László

Fricz Tamás

Gazdag Ferenc

Hervainé Szabó Gyöngyvér

Ignácz Lilla

Juberías, Carlos Flores

Kiss Gy. Csaba

Kiszelly Zoltán

Kondor Katalin

Kossuth Borbála †

Koudela Pál

Kovács István Gergely

Krupavičius, Algis

Lentner Csaba

Lóránt Károly

Lőrinczné Bencze Edit

Máthé Áron

Mészáros József

Nagy Bálint

Nyakas Szilárd

Pankucsi Márta

Patkó Edina

Pokol Béla

Pop, Irina Michaela

Pop, Lia Maria

Saldívar V., Américo

Sallai János

Simándi Irén

Simon János

Stumpf István

Syi, Szakadát István

Szabó Máté

Szabó Tibor

Szalai Attila †

Szánthó Miklós

Szmolka, Inmaculada

Toots, Anu

Tóth I. János

Varga Csaba

Vizi László Tamás

Wiatr, Jerzy J.

Zachar Péter Krisztián

Zárug Péter Farkas

Szakmai lektorok

Dr. Kossuth Borbála † és Prof. dr. Simon János

A kéziratok lezárásának időpontja: 2020. ősz

Kiadja a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem

Ludovika Egyetemi Kiadó

A kiadásért felel: Deli Gergely rektor

Székhely: 1083 Budapest, Ludovika tér 2.

Kapcsolat: kiadvanyok@uni-nke.hu

Felelős szerkesztő: Inzsöl Kata

Olvasószerkesztő: Gergely Zsuzsánna és Tompa Eszter

Korrektor: Gergely Zsuzsánna és Kutas Éva

Tördelőszerkesztő: Fehér Angéla

Nyomdai kivitelezés: Pátria Nyomda Zrt.

Felelős vezető: Orgován Katalin vezérigazgató

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36250/00983.00

ISBN 978-963-531-582-6 (nyomtatott)

ISBN 978-963-531-584-0 (ePDF) | ISBN 978-963-531-583-3 (ePub)

© A szerkesztő, 2022

© A szerzők, 2022

© A kiadó, 2022

Minden jog védve.

A borító A köztársaság kikiáltása a Kossuth téren (MTI Fotó) című fénykép felhasználásával készült.

Tartalom

Foreign Authors

Magyar szerzők

Bevezető gondolatok (Gulyás Gergely)

Köszöntő (Koltay András)

Előszó (Simon János)

The Changes – In an International Context

Josep M. Colomer: National Sovereignty and Multiple Governments

Jerzy J. Wiatr: National Security in an Unsafe World – A Central European Perspective

Lia Maria Pop – Irina Michaela Pop: Xenophobia in 2020 Europe – A View on Xenophobic Political Parties

Antonello Biagini – Andrea Carteny: After the Fall of the Wall, ‘Ostalgia’: From Berlin to Budapest?

Inmaculada Szmolka: A Theoretical and Methodological Proposal for Analysing the Effects of Political Change on Political Regimes

Algis Krupavičius: Lithuania in Comparative Perspective: From Transition to Flawed Democracy

Anu Toots: Transformation of the Estonian Welfare State in the 21st Century – Saying Goodbye to Bismarck?

Carlos Flores Juberías: Spain and the EU Eastward Enlargement

Américo Saldívar V.: Exemplary People in Mexico and Hungary – A Brief Comparative History from the Mexican Perspective

Ilán Bizberg: Politics and the Pandemic in the World

Mohammad Farid Bin Abedin Bhuiyan: Central and Eastern European Political and Economic Integration 147

Részvétel és választások

Mészáros József – Syi: Politikai folytonosság és változás Magyarországon – Nyolc választás adataiból

Simon János: Él-e még a politika mint tudomány Magyarországon? – A választás szabadsága és az igazság a politikában

Nagy Bálint – Zachar Péter Krisztián: Az első szabad választások és a magyar médiahelyzet

Kiszelly Zoltán: A demokrácia részvételi eleme: harminc év kísérletei

Alkotmány és jog

Varga Csaba: Sikerek és kudarcok, várakozások és tapasztalások

Stumpf István: A jogállami forradalomtól a második alkotmányos rendszerváltozásig – Fókuszban az Alkotmánybíróság

Pokol Béla: Kettős állam és jogduplázódás – Kutatásaim összegzése

Cservák Csaba: Az Alkotmánybíróság kialakulása és sajátosságai a rendszerváltás során

Kovács István Gergely: Dogmák helyett értékek – Magyarország Alkotmánybíróságának rendszerváltoztatás kori és mai gyakorlata

Pártok és civil társadalom

Máthé Áron: Egy külföldről irányított rendszerváltás – 1944. március 19. – Magyarország német megszállásának mai megítéléséhez

Kiss Gy. Csaba: Jegyzetek a magyar átmenet historiográfiájához

Sallai János: A „nagy bontás” – A vasfüggöny felszedése a gondolattól a megvalósulásig

Fricz Tamás: Tervezettség és spontaneitás – Ki irányította a közép-európai rendszerváltásokat?

Szabó Máté: Civil társadalom a demokratikus átmenet, a konszolidáció és a hibridizáció időszakában

Zárug Péter Farkas: A magyar kalandordemokrácia kialakulásának alapjai – A jogfolytonosság fétise mint a lusztráció guillotine-ja

Nemzetközi kapcsolatok, Európai Unió és biztonságpolitika

Gazdag Ferenc: A magyar külpolitika stratégiai irányairól 1990–2020

Lóránt Károly: Az európai integráció jövője

Szánthó Miklós: Nyugatra tartunk. Nyugatra vágyunk?

Tóth I. János: A demográfiai téltől a konzervatív modernizációig

Koudela Pál: Globális Budapest és a migráció

Lőrinczné Bencze Edit: A demokratikus konszolidáció eredményei és korlátai a rendszerváltó Horvátországban

Domonkos László: A déli változat – rendszerváltás, magyarok, Jugoszlávia

Közélet, kultúra, kommunikáció

Csepeli György: A politikai hiszékenység három évtizede – avagy az elvehetetlen ironikus szabadság – Hiedelmek, demokrácia, hiszékenység heurisztikája

Nyakas Szilárd: Elszólás, nyelvi döbbenet, koincidenciák – A beszéd közélete

Szabó Tibor: A magyar közélet jellegzetes vonásai (1990–2020)

Kondor Katalin: Szabadon? Sajtóról, közéletről, kultúráról a „demokratikus” Európában

Pankucsi Márta: A gettóügytől a fészekrakók kilakoltatásán át a lyukói nyomortelepig

Simándi Irén: A Szabad Európa Rádió irodája Budapesten

Gazdaság és pénzügy

Hervainé Szabó Gyöngyvér: Magyarország környezetében: A gazdasági és társadalmi jóllét komparatív mutatói 1989–2019 között

Csath Magdolna: A magyar versenyképesség javításához erősíteni kell a gazdasági válságálló képességet

Lentner Csaba: Harminc év után szabadon: közpénzügyi restrikció vagy expanzió?

Becsey Zsolt: A magyar gazdasági versenyképesség és az uniós felzárkózás az elmúlt tíz évben régiós tükörben

Bogár László: Egy ismeretlen főszereplő: a rendszerváltozás – Tény, igazság, valóság és lényeg

Boros Imre: Nagy bajban van a Nyugat pénze

Évfordulók – 100 éve

Szalai Attila †: Találkozásom II. János Pál pápával

Vizi László Tamás: Trianon, rendszerváltás és a „nemzeti önérzetünknek parancsszava”

Ignácz Lilla – Kossuth Borbála †: Harsányi János, az utolsó magyar polihisztor

Patkó Edina: Ravasz László, a humanista teológus élete és munkássága – református püspökké választásának 100. évfordulójára

Foreign Authors

Biagini, Antonello Folco is Emeritus Professor of History of Eastern Europe at Sapienza University, and Rector of Unitelma Sapienza University of Rome. His studies focus on East European History in the 19th–21st centuries, with attention to military and national trends, before and after WW1, Socialist regimes in Europe and Russia, post-Communist transitions. antonello.biagini@uniroma1.it

Bin Abedin Bhuiyan, Mohammad Farid is a Bangladeshi Economist and Political Scientist. faridabedin@gmail.com

Bizberg, Ilan is French–Mexican Professor and Researcher at the Colegio de México. ilan@colmex.mex

Carteny, Andrea is Professor of History of International Relations at the SARAS (History) Department of Sapienza University of Rome. His research focuses on the concept of nationalism and national identity in the 19th–21st centuries, mainly in the Mediterranean region, Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasian regions. Andrea.carteny@uniroma1.it

Colomer, Josep M. is a Spanish–American Political Scientist and Economist. Currently he is Professor at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. josep.colomer@gmail.com

Juberias, Carlos Flores is a Spanish Jurisprudent and Social Scientist at the University of Valencia. Carlos.flores@univ

Krupavičius, Algis is a Lithuanian Professor of Political Science at Vytautas Magnus University of Vilnius. algis.krupavicius@vdu.lt

Pop, Irina Michaela is a Romanian Assistant Professor of Journalism and Communication Studies at the University of Oradea. popirinamichaela@gmail.com

Pop, Lia Maria is a Romanian Professor of Political Science, former Dean of the Faculty of Media and Political Sciences at the University of Oradea. popmarialia@yahoo.com

Saldívar V., Américo is a Mexican Professor Emeritus of Social Science at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). americo@unam.mx

Szmolka, Inmaculada is Polish–Spanish Professor at the Department of Political Science and Administration of the University of Granada. iszmolka@ugr.es

Toots, Anu is an Estonian Social Scientist, Professor of Social Science Policy at the School of Governance, Law and Society of the University of Tallin. anu.toots@tlu.ee

Wiatr, Jerzy J. is a Polish Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Warsaw and ex-President of the Central European Political Science Association (2000–20003). jwiatr@ewspa.edu.pl

Magyar szerzők

Becsey Zsolt László közgazdász (PhD), volt diplomata és európai parlamenti képviselő, a Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem oktatója. Fő kutatási területe a közép-európai országok felzárkózása az Európai Unión belül és a magyar külgazdasági kapcsolatok. Elérhetősége: zsolt.becsey@gmail.com

Bogár László közgazdász, a politikatudományok kandidátusa, a Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem docense. Fő kutatási területe a globális hatalomgazdaság struktúradinamikája. Elérhetősége: bogarlaszlo51@gmail.com

Boros Imre közgazdász, közíró. Érdeklődési területei: nemzetközi pénzrendszerek, integráció. Elérhetősége: drborosimre@gmail.com

Csath Magdolna közgazdász, a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem kutatóprofesszora, valamint a Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem kutatásvezetője. Fő kutatási területei: a versenyképesség, az innováció, az MKKV-szektor és a termelékenység. Elérhetősége: csath.magdolna@uni-nke.hu

Csepeli György magyar szociálpszichológus, szociológus, nyugalmazott egyetemi tanár, az Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Társadalomtudományi Kar professzor emeritusza, a Szociológia Doktori Iskola Interdiszciplináris Társadalomtudományi Kutatások Doktori Programjának alapítója és programvezetője.

Cservák Csaba alkotmányjogász, a Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar Alkotmányjogi Tanszékének tanszékvezető egyetemi tanára és alapító szakvezetője (alapjogvédelmi szakjogászképzés), a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem tudományos főmunkatársa, a Köztársasági Elnöki Hivatal v. hivatalvezetője.

Domonkos László író, újságíró, szerkesztő. Eddig 38 kötete jelent meg, elsősorban történelmi esszék, de több publicisztika-, esszé- és egy novelláskötete is megjelent. Dolgozott Szegeden a Délmagyarországnál, majd a Magyarok Világszövetsége lapjánál, a Duna Televízióban és a RETÖRKI-ben. A Trianoni Szemle szerkesztőségének tagja, a Magyar Hírlap szerződéses munkatársa. Elérhetősége: domonkosla@gmail.hu

Fricz Tamás politológus, filozófus, közgazdász, a politikatudományok kandidátusa (PhD). A Rendszerváltás Történetét Kutató Intézet és Archívum tudományos tanácsadója és kutatási csoportvezetője, az Alapjogokért Központ kutatási tanácsadója, a Magyar Nemzet külső publicistája. Főbb kutatási területei: rendszerváltás Magyarországon és a közép- és kelet-európai országokban, pártok és pártrendszerek, demokratikus rendszerek, törésvonalak (cleavages) a 21. században, az Európai Unió története, illetve az EU politikai-hatalmi szerkezete. Elérhetősége: fricztamas@gmail.com

Gazdag Ferenc, a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem professzor emeritusza, az MTA doktora, a Magyar Akkreditációs Bizottság Plénumának tagja. A European Security and Defence College Academic Board tagja. Kutatási területei: magyar kül- és biztonságpolitika, francia külpolitika. Elérhetősége: gazdag.ferenc@uni-nke.hu

Hervainé Szabó Gyöngyvér, a Kodolányi János Egyetem főiskolai tanára, rektori tanácsadója, a Szolgáltatás és Tudásgazdaság Kutató és Fejlesztő Intézet vezetője. Elérhetősége: szgyongy@kodolanyi.hu

Kiss Gy. Csaba művelődéstörténész, az MTA doktora, az Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem címzetes egyetemi tanára, a Magyar Demokrata Fórum egyik alapítója. Főbb kutatási területei: nacionalizmus, nemzeti jelképek Közép-Európában.

Kiszelly Zoltán politológus, a Kodolányi János Egyetem főiskolai docense, a Századvég Politikai Elemzések Központjának igazgatója. Fő kutatási területe a pártfinanszírozás, valamint a német és az európai politika. Elérhetősége: zookiszelly@gmx.de

Kondor Katalin közgazdaság-tudományi egyetemet végzett újságíró, pár hónapot leszámítva nyugdíjaztatásáig a Magyar Rádiónál dolgozott. Ez idő tájt különböző lapokban (Magyar Hírlap, Aracs, Honvilág stb.) jelennek meg írásai, több felkérést kap rendezvények műsorvezetőjeként is, havonta egy alkalommal a Klebelsberg Kúriában beszélget egy meghívott vendéggel. Elérhetősége: kondorkatalin1@gmail.com

Kossuth Borbála (1979–2021) jogász, szociológus, a nemzetközi tanulmányok szakértője, a Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem és a Kodolányi János Egyetem megbízott oktatója, a Harsányi János Tudásközpont főmunkatársa. Kutatási területei: emberi jogok és a demokrácia intézményei.

Ignácz Lilla filozófus (PhD), jogász, a Honvédelmi Minisztériumban jogi szakreferens, a Harsányi János Tudásközpont főmunkatársa. Főbb kutatási területe: logika, hermeneutika. Elérhetősége: ignacz.lilla@t-online.hu

Koudela Pál szociológus, a Kodolányi János Egyetem főiskolai tanára, a Harsányi János Tudásközpont főmunkatársa. Főbb kutatási területei: migráció és szabályozása, nagyvárosok társadalma. Elérhetősége: pkoudela@yahoo.com

Kovács István Gergely jogász, az Alapjogokért Központ stratégiai igazgatója. Szakterülete az Európai Unió joga, az EU „alkotmányos szabályai”. Korábban az Európai Parlament és az amerikai kormány ösztöndíjasa. Számos jogi és politikai cikk, tanulmány és könyv szerzője, társszerzője. Nős, két leánygyermek édesapja. Elérhetősége: istvan.gergely.kovacs@gmail.com

Lőrinczné Bencze Edit regionalista, nemzetközi kapcsolatok szakértő, a Kodolányi János Egyetem Humánfejlesztési Tanulmányok Tanszék tanszékvezetője, habilitált főiskolai tanára, a Harsányi János Tudásközpont főmunkatársa. Főbb kutatási területei: területi politika, Nyugat-Balkán, Horvátország, az EU bővítési politikája. Elérhetősége: lbedit@kodolanyi.hu

Lentner Csaba közpénzügytan-professzor, a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem Államtudományi és Nemzetközi Tanulmányok Kar oktatója, a Széll Kálmán Állampénzügyi Kutatóműhely vezetője. Főbb kutatási területe: fiskális és monetáris szabályozás. Elérhetősége: lentner.csaba@uni-nke.hu

Lóránt Károly mérnök-közgazdász. A Rendszerváltás Történetét Kutató Intézet (RETÖRKI) nyugalmazott tudományos munkatársa. Civil szervezetek képviseletében együtt dolgozik az Európai Parlament képviselőivel, nyugati civil szervezetekkel és közgazdászokkal az európai együttműködés és gazdaságpolitika alternatív lehetőségein.

Máthé Áron történész (PhD), szociológus. A Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottságának elnökhelyettese, korábban a Terror Háza Múzeum, illetve a Századvég Politikai Iskola Alapítvány munkatársa. Fő kutatási területe a 20. századi totalitárius diktatúrák története és azok társadalmi emlékezete. Legutóbb megjelent kötete: Vörös karszalag. Ideiglenes karhatalmi osztagok 1944–1945 (Jaffa Kiadó). Elérhetősége: aron.mathe@neb.hu

Mészáros József matematikus, szociológus, a Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem egyetemi tanára, a Nyíregyházi Egyetemért Alapítvány Kuratóriumának elnöke. Főbb kutatási területei: társadalmi választások elmélete, alkalmazott matematikai statisztika, nyugdíjbiztosítás. Elérhetősége: meszaros.jozsef@barankovics.hu

Nagy Bálint, a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem hallgatója, a Kossuth Rádió szerkesztője és riportere. Elérhetősége: nbalint97@gmail.com

Nyakas Szilárd Mikszáth Kálmán-díjas újságíró, egyetemi oktató (közéleti kommunikáció), a Magyar Rádiózásért-díj tulajdonosa. Elérhetősége: nyakas.szilard@gmail.com

Pankucsi Márta jogász, szociológus, filozófia szakos előadó, a Furmann Dávid Társadalomkutató és Innovációs Központ vezetője. Főbb kutatási területei: társadalmi innováció, bizalom, legitimáció, tőkekonvertáció. Elérhetőségei: pankucsimarta@gmail.com, www.pankmart.hu

Patkó Edina filozófus, közgazdász, újságíró, a Miskolci Egyetem doktorjelöltje. 2006–2008 között a Miskolci Egyetem Politikatudományi Tanszékén politikai filozófiát tanított. Kutatási területe a 20. századi magyar protestantizmus, a kanti, neokantiánus filozófia hatása a 20. századi magyar református teológiára. Publikációi: A kantiánus elemek Ravasz László gondolkodásában; A nőkérdésről: félfordulat Immanuel Kantnál, egész fordulat Ravasz Lászlónál; Az erkölcs Ravasz László gondolatvilágában. 2000-től a Rábaparti Kft. társtulajdonos-ügyvezetője. Elérhetősége: patkoedina39@gmail.com

Pokol Béla jogász, szociológus, politológus, az Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem professzor emeritusza, az MTA doktora. Elérhetősége: pokolb@ajk.elte.hu

Sallai János rendőrtiszt, történelemtudós (PhD), a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem tanszékvezető egyetemi tanára. Főbb kutatási területei: rendészettudomány, rendészettörténet, államhatár-történet. Elérhetőség: sallai.janos@uni-nke.hu

Simándi Irén történész, a Kodolányi János Egyetem egyetemi tanára, a Harsányi János Tudásközpont főmunkatársa. Főbb kutatási területe: a 20. század politikatörténete, médiatörténet. Elérhetősége: simandiiren@gmail.com

Simon János politológus, szociológus, történész, a Central European Political Science Review főszerkesztője, a Kodolányi János Egyetem Demokrácia Kutató Intézetének igazgatóprofesszora, a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem kutatóprofesszora és a Harsányi János Tudásközpont igazgatója. Kutatási területei: politikai kultúra, demokrácia, pártok, választások. Elérhetősége: janossimon11@gmail.com

Stumpf István jogász, politológus, szociológus, egyetemi tanár, a politikatudományok kandidátusa, a felsőoktatási modellváltás koordinációjáért felelős kormánybiztos, valamint a Tokaj-Hegyalja Egyetemért Alapítvány elnöke, volt alkotmánybíró, egykori kancelláriaminiszter. Elérhetősége: stumpf57@gmail.com

Syi (Szakadát István) szociológus, matematikusmérnök, egyetemi docens, a Budapesti Műszaki és Gazdaságtudományi Egyetem Szociológia és Kommunikáció Tanszékének tanszékvezetője. Kutatási területei: cselekvéselmélet, játékelmélet, a digitális transzformáció elméletei és gyakorlatai. Elérhetősége: i@syi.hu

Szabó Máté jogász, politológus, az Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Karának egyetemi tanára, az MTA doktora. Főbb kutatási területei: a társadalmi mozgalmak és a politikai tiltakozás, az emberi jogok és az ombudsmanok. Elérhetősége: szabo.mate@ajk.elte.hu

Szabó Tibor filozófus, politológus, a Szegedi Tudományegyetem professzor emeritusza. Főbb kutatási területei: olasz, francia és magyar filozófia- és politikatörténet. Elérhetősége: SzaboTibor@szte.hu

Szalai Attila (1950–2020) újságíró, diplomata, Lengyelország-szakértő. 1976 és 1990 között Varsóban élt.

Szánthó Miklós jogász, politikai elemző, az Alapjogokért Központ igazgatója, a Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány elnöke. Fő kutatási területe az alkotmányjogot és politikát is befolyásoló világnézeti küzdelmek. Írásai, publicisztikái rendszeresen jelennek meg a hazai és nemzetközi sajtóban, tudományos folyóiratokban. 2021-ben a Magyar Érdemrend Lovagkeresztjének polgári tagozatával ismerték el munkásságát.

Tóth I. János filozófus, a Szegedi Tudományegyetem Filozófia Tanszékének habilitált docense. Főbb kutatási területei: alkalmazott etika, környezetfilozófia, a játékelmélet és a demográfia társadalomfilozófiai kérdései. Az Alkalmazott Filozófiai Társaság titkára, tagja az SZTE Málnási Bartók György Filozófia Doktori Iskolának, illetve több hazai és nemzetközi társaságnak. 150 publikáció és számos monográfia és jegyzet szerzője. Legfontosabb három könyve: Játékelmélet és társadalom (1997), Fejezetek a környezetfilozófiából (2005), Demográfiai tél. A modernizáció sötét oldala (2021). Elérhetősége: joth@philo.u-szeged.hu

Varga Csaba jogfilozófus (DSc, 1991), Széchenyi-díjas (2013), a Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem professzor emeritusza, az egykori akadémiai Jogtudományi Intézetben kutató professzor emeritusz. Főbb vizsgálódási területe: jogfilozófia és jogelmélet, makroszintű jogszociológia, jogantropológia és jogösszehasonlítás, továbbá jogállami átmenet és joguralom. Elérhetősége: varga.csaba@jak.ppke.hu

Vizi László Tamás jogász, történész (PhD), a Magyarságkutató Intézet tudományos főigazgató-helyettese, a Kodolányi János Egyetem rektorhelyettese, főiskolai tanára. Főbb kutatási területe a magyar nemesi felkelés története a francia háborúk korában, valamint Trianon és a két háború közötti időszak magyar politikatörténete, a trianoni békeszerződés magyar aláíróinak élete. Elérhetősége: vizi.laszlo.tamas@mki.gov.hu; lvizi@kodolanyi.hu

Zachar Péter Krisztián történész, a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem habilitált egyetemi docense, az Államtudományi és Nemzetközi Tanulmányok Kar Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok és Diplomácia Tanszék vezetője. Fő kutatási területe a modern politika- és társadalomtörténet. Elérhetősége: zachar.peter.krisztian@uni-nke.hu

Zárug Péter Farkas politológus, politikai elemző, kampányszakértő, a Miskolci Egyetem Alkalmazott Társadalomtudományok Intézetének adjunktusa. Kutatási területe: a magyar rendszerváltozás, a magyar parlamentarizmus működési mechanizmusai és pártviszonyai, valamint a politikai kommunikáció és marketing területe. Legutóbb a történeti politológia területén jelent meg monográfiája Tudós-politikusok kora címmel (L’Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2021). Elérhetősége: zarugpeter@gmail.com

Bevezető gondolatok

Tisztelt Olvasó!

A rendszerváltoztatás felemelő pillanatok egész sorát hozta el, amelyek kitárták a szabadság kapuját. Ezek a pillanatok – bár sokakhoz elértek – mégsem álltak össze egyetlen nagy közös élménnyé, amely erőt adhatott volna a rendszerváltoztatás magyar társadalmának a rendkívül komoly áldozatokkal járó átalakuláshoz.

Az út, amelyet a „szabadság vándorainak” be kellett járniuk, hosszú volt. Napjainkban, majdnem harminckét évvel Nagy Imréék temetése, harmincegy évvel a szabad választások és harminc esztendővel a szovjet csapatok távozása után a legrövidebb történelmi távlat már adott.

A rendszerváltoztatás pillanata a mögöttünk hagyott két évszázad történelmi sorsfordulói közül az egyetlen, amely Magyarország számára hosszabb távon is szabadságot és nemzeti önrendelkezést hozott. A rendszerváltoztatást sikerült vér nélkül, békés körülmények között véghez vinni. Magyarország átállt az államszocializmusról a piacgazdaságra. Az ország visszanyerte az 1944-ben elvesztett szuverenitását, a vasfüggöny leomlott, az utolsó szovjet csapatok is elhagyták hazánk területét, és Magyarország másfél évtizeden belül polgárainak szabad akaratából csatlakozott a transzatlanti katonai szövetséghez és az Európai Unióhoz.

E folyamat a magyar társadalom számára azonban sok csalódással is járt: nem sikerült rövid időn belül felzárkóznunk a nyugati életszínvonalhoz. A rendszerváltoztatás morális adóssága a lusztráció és az igazságtétel elmaradása. Az MSZMP megszűnt ugyan, azonban utódpártjai máig velünk élnek, ahogyan az állampárt hálózatai sem tűntek el egyik napról a másikra – sőt sok prominense mentette át egykori politikai tőkéjét gazdasági, kulturális tőkévé.

A rendszerváltó erők 2010 utáni, több mint egy évtizede tartó kormányzása számtalan morális adósságot törlesztett. Ezek közül is kiemelkedik az új alkotmány elfogadása, amely két évtized távlatából nemcsak megerősítette a rendszerváltoztatás jogállami forradalmának vívmányait, de – identitásunk meghatározásának részeként – a magyar nemzet mai szabadságát is az 1956-os forradalomból származtatja.

Mindezen események mélyebb mozgatórugóinak kutatása, feldolgozása és közkinccsé tétele azért is kiemelten fontos, mert az 1990 óta eltelt három évtized alatt többségében elköszönt tőlünk az a nemzedék, amely a kommunista diktatúra előtti évtizedekben a szabadság és az összetartozás nemzeti eszményét megőrizve küzdötte végig a rendszerváltoztatást, és az alapoktól kezdte újra Magyarország felépítését. Érett korba lépett egy nemzedék, amelynek a rendszerváltoztatás jutott ifjúságként, s megélte ennek a harminc évnek minden sikerét és csalódását. Felnőtt egy nemzedék, amely már csak könyvekből és filmekből ismeri, vagy érzelemmentes iskolai tananyagként találkozott az egykor létezett szocializmus diktatúrájával, és amelynek a rendszerváltoztatás már nem személyes emlék, csak történelem.

Különösen fontos tehát, hogy a valóságot a lehető legjobban megismerve feldolgozzuk a múltat, s így értsük mindazt, amit napjainkban is érvényes üzenetként tovább kell vinnünk, ha a magyarságot szabadságban élő, szuverén nemzetalkotó közösségként akarjuk megőrizni.

E tanulmánykötet fontos eszköz a mögöttünk hagyott harminc év megismerésére és értékelésére.

Gulyás Gergely

Miniszterelnökséget vezető miniszter

Köszöntő

Ez a gazdag és sokszínű szerzőgárdát felvonultató kötet a három évtizeddel ezelőtti közép-kelet-európai rendszerváltoztatásokra, azon belül elősorban a magyar jogállami átalakulásra emlékezik, és egy, a világjárvány miatt sajnálatos módon elmaradt konferencia előadásainak írott változatát tartalmazza. Az immáron több mint harminc évvel ezelőtt történtek, a vasfüggöny megnyílta meghatározó élmény mindazoknak, akik átélték. 1989-ben ledőlt a berlini fal, majd a rákövetkező évben, nem sokkal azután, hogy Lothar Matthäus a nyugatnémet labdarúgó válogatott csapatkapitányaként a magasba emelte a világbajnoki trófeát, a két Németország jogi értelemben is egyesült. A németek egymásra találása tette leginkább átélhetővé a kettéosztott kontinens átalakulását, amelyből a nyugati határnyitással mi is kivettük a részünket. A változások szele – ahogy akkor a Scorpions zenekar is megénekelte – Magyarországra is begyűrűzött, a berlini fal eltakarításakor Magyarország már nem volt többé népköztársaság.

A 2020-as harmincéves évforduló alkalom arra, hogy emlékezzünk saját szabadságunk visszanyerésére, és persze arra is, hogy mi vezetett az európai kontinens kettéosztásáig, egyúttal Magyarország tönkretételéig. A 20. század történelmét mi, magyarok is sokszorosan megszenvedtük: benne két vesztes világháború, Trianon, a holokauszt és a kommunizmus pusztítása. Harminc éve kezdődött a visszatalálás a történelem kizökkent menetébe.

Harminc év… páratlanul hosszú időszak az újkori magyar történelemben, amelyet – ha lehetett is volna sikeresebb – külső elnyomó hatalmak igájától távol töltöttük. Sorsunkat saját jó és rossz döntéseink által irányítottuk. Erőszakos külső fenyegetés nélküli, de belső feszültségektől szabdalt évtizedek, amelyek után a közös társadalmi minimumban, értékrendben való megegyezés lehetősége a politikai-közéleti erők és szereplők között ma talán távolabbinak tűnik, mint három évtizede. Szimbolikus és sokatmondó példája ennek a budai várnegyedben jelenleg is zajló építkezések megítélése. Akik a háború és a kommunizmus által elpusztított épületek egy részének visszaépítését kívánják, ebben történelmi helyreállító munkát látnak. Mások építészeti, politikai, egyéb érveket állítanak az elképzelésekkel szemben. Megítélésem szerint azonban nem szakmai vagy művészi, hanem elsősorban erkölcsi kérdésről van szó. A háború után részben úgy-ahogy helyreállított, részben oktalanul lerombolt budai várnegyed legalább részleges visszaépítése a magyar államiság és hagyományok tiszteletéből fakadó morális kötelezettség akkor, ha egy állam – gazdaságilag és minden más szempontból is – elég erős ahhoz, hogy azt megtehesse. Hasonló a helyzet a berlini Stadtschloss-szal, a Hohenzollernek palotájával, a 19. században egységesülő német állam formális központjával, ami szintén újraépül. Helyes, hogy mindkettő körül éles viták folytak és folynak, és helyes, ha visszaépülnek. Mint ahogy az is példás, hogy nem uralkodók és arisztokraták ülnek majd bennük. A régi-új épületek összekötik a múltat a jövővel, modern, új funkciót kapnak, és erős, önbizalommal teli 21. századi nemzetek képét sugározzák majd. Berlinben a palota az Unter den Linden utolsó még hiányzó mozaikdarabja, míg ránk a budai váron túl is vár még némi munka, amíg a háború és a kommunizmus pusztításának nyomait a kövekből és a lelkekből is eltüntetjük.

A megkésettségből, a sietség kényszeréből félreértések is adódhatnak. A békés, egységes és erős Európa, a schumanni és adenaueri gondolat hívei vagyunk, de ezen elvek gyakorlatba ültetésének egyenjogúságon és egymás értékeinek kölcsönös elismerésén kell alapulnia. Azért is érdemes a kerek évfordulókon megadni a módját az emlékezésnek, mert a harminc évvel ezelőtt történtekből erőt meríthetünk mai problémáink megoldásához. Ha sikerült megdönteni a kommunista rendszert, meghaladni a jaltai békerendet, légiessé tenni az Európán belüli határokat, ezzel enyhítve a 20. század megannyi sérelmének fájdalmát, akkor a nemzetközi, európai együttműködés éppen aktuális válságaival is megküzdünk valahogy.

A rendszerváltoztatás kerek évfordulóját ünnepelve örüljünk együtt az elnyert szabadság adta lehetőségeknek, az országhatárokon, sőt, óceánokon átívelő nyílt, őszinte eszmecsere lehetőségének. Ennek jegyében kívánok minden tisztelt Olvasónak elmélyülést a kötet értékes tanulmányaihoz!

Koltay András

prorektor

Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem

Előszó

A tisztelt Olvasó az évfordulós könyvek legújabb kötetét tartja kezében, amely a 30 éve szabadon konferencia több mint félszáz tudományos tanulmányát tartalmazza.

E sorok írója társaival 2000-ben megszervezte a Tíz éve szabadon nemzetközi konferenciát, több mint félszáz magyar és nemzetközi társadalomtudós részvételével. Ezt a Húsz éve szabadon, majd a 25 éve szabadon évfordulós rendezvény követte. Mindhárom nagy nemzetközi tanácskozáson több mint félszáz előadás hangzott el, amelyekből egy nagy sikerű könyvsorozat született. Az első és a harmadik rendezvényt az Országházban tartottuk, a másodikat a Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Dísztermében.

2020-ban is szerettük volna megünnepelni a harmincéves évfordulót, de a pandémia közbeszólt, s az elkészült előadások nem hangozhattak el. Ez még inkább arra ösztönzött bennünket, hogy az el nem hangzott előadásokat kötetbe szerkesztve megjelentessük. Ehhez méltó partnert találtunk a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem vezetésében.

A kötet 51 neves szerzőjének 43 írása emlékeztetni szeretné a tisztelt Olvasót a régi diktatúrára, a rendszerváltás folyamatára, az azóta eltelt harminc év küzdelmeire és mindezek szakmai tanulságaira. A könyv azt is mutatja, hogy a társadalomtudósok 2020-ban hogyan értelmezték a múltat és a jelent, hogy reményeink szerint ennek ismeretében jobban megérthessük a valóságban zajló folyamatokat és rejtett lehetőségeket. A múltat ismernünk kell, hogy a jelenben tudjunk gondolkodni, és jobb jövőt tudjunk építeni!

A demokrácia intézményesített szabadság. Felelősségünk, hogy a legjobb lehetőségeket intézményesítsük, hiszen csak így tudjuk folyamatosan védeni és fejleszteni, hogy örökre a szabadság világában élhessünk.

A 20 éves, a 25 éves és a mostani évfordulós kötet összeállításában nagy munkát végzett az időközben elhunyt dr. Kossuth Borbála (1979–2021) kollégánk, ezért e könyvvel rá is emlékezünk.

Simon János,

a kötet szerkesztője

The Changes – In an International Context

Josep M. Colomer

National Sovereignty and Multiple Governments

Introduction

To make the complexity of the current globalised world governable, the processes of decision-making must be simplified. Each of the multiple levels and sectors of government should deal with specific policy issues. None of them should claim jurisdiction over all policy and collective issues.

The model of multiple levels of government militates against the claim of unity of powers or ‘sovereignty’, which has become one of the most obsolete political concepts in the current world. The concept of sovereignty was coined long ago, by the mid-seventeenth century, by such luminaries like the English Thomas Hobbes and the French Jean Bodin, with the intention of justifying the strengthening of the central powers of the monarchy. The root ‘sover-’ comes from the Latin ‘super’, or supreme. The monarch’s sover-eignty or supre-macy was conceived as ‘absolute’ and the subsequent political regime as ‘absolutism’. That is why we still sometimes call – a current king or queen the ‘mon-arch’, that is, the only or ‘mono-’ holder of decision power, or ‘the sove-reign’, even if almost nobody enjoys such monistic or absolute powers nowadays.

Redefining national sovereignty in a globalised world

Many currently existing constitutions enshrine ‘sovereignty’ of the ‘people’, the ‘parliament’, the ‘nation’ or the ‘state’, but the concept is the same as it was created centuries ago for the monarchs, only allocated now to somewhat different subjects. Sovereignty continues to be conceived as ‘absolute’. It implies that one single political body has the prerogative to make final decisions on all public issues within a clearly-bordered territory. In reality, almost no monarch, dictator, president, parliament, people, state or nation has this power nowadays.

Sovereignty is not what it was nor what it was assumed it would be. Today, international law is claimed to have direct effect on the citizens of every country; the global institutions’ work consists precisely in coordinating, shaping, approving and making public policies enforceable by the states, for which tasks they frequently interfere in domestic affairs; almost all the states are deprived from the unlimited power to produce laws, which was implied by the notion of sovereignty.

The current world is not one in which states interact as independent entities but one of interdependence. When the campaigners for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union or Brexit spread the slogan ‘take back control’, they implicitly acknowledged that the British Government had lost the absolute control of its internal affairs, mainly although not only at the hands of the European Union. But the Brexiters discovered very soon that in a globalised world the government cannot control many public issues as it was presumed it would be.

Some politicians talk of ‘limited’, ‘shared’, ‘divided’ or ‘partial’ sovereignty when they face undeniable international memberships and commitments. Similar expressions are used sometimes to deal with internal divisions of powers between central and territorial governments in federal-type countries. Yet those expressions are an oxymoron. Sovereignty is absolute or it is not sovereignty; it cannot be shared or divided. The president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, as well as the president of France Emmanuel Macron, sometimes encouraged a ‘European sovereignty’. With this, they acknowledged the erosion of nation states’ sovereignty. But obviously, they did not mean that the states of Europe should submit all public policies to final decisions by the EU. What these and similar expressions by politicians at different levels intend to transmit is the wish that some level of government – local, national, continental or global – should be able to make final decisions on some issues. They are different issues for each level of government – which is the opposite of sovereignty as traditionally and legally conceived as the power to make final decisions on everything.

Most states of the world have exerted their legal sovereignty to give up the actual exercise of their sovereignty on many policy issues. Yielding some part of sovereignty to an international power destroys the very meaning of sovereignty. Formally, once inside an international institution, each state keeps the legal right to exert its formal sovereignty and leave. But this rarely happens. Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations, but only for 20 months in 1965–1966, its absence being registered as a ‘cessation of cooperation’. The United States left the UNESCO in 1984 after accusing it of advancing Soviet interests; it returned, only to leave again, together with Israel, in 2017 after Palestine was voted in full membership. The United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union in 2016 with catastrophic consequences. As these few experiences suggest, the costs of leaving or backing away from international organisations or commitments are very high.

In federal countries, attempts by central governments to regain their sovereignty by taking back powers that are in the hands of local governments also tend to involve bitter political crises. As long as the economic, technological and human trends keep developing as they have done for decades, the loss of sovereignty of any single unit will become irreversible.

Multiple level unions

The member states of the largest continental or multi-state unions, such as the United States of America and the European Union, have largely given up their sovereignty even in legal terms.

Let us look at the evolution of the concept over time. During the campaign for the initial thirteen independent states to ratify the U.S. Constitution in the late eighteenth century, one of its main authors, James Madison, argued that ‘each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others’. He assured that ‘the States will retain under the proposed Constitution a very extensive portion of active sovereignty’, and upheld that ‘the power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined, [while] those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite’.

Yet when the Constitutional Convention submitted the constitutional text to Congress, it noted that: ‘It is obviously impracticable to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to state, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all.’ An early Amendment clarified that ‘the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States’. But the word ‘sovereignty’, which was initially associated with the states, does not appear in the Constitution of the U.S. It holds, rather the other way around, that: ‘This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States […] shall be the supreme Law of the Land.’

The tension between the two levels of government was durable. By the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court confirmed that ‘the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance are supreme, they control the Constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them’. In reaction, several states defended their rights to enforce their own rules on numerous issues, much beyond the basic affairs related with taxes, police or the expropriation of private property for public services – including, most ominously, the right to own slaves. This strain triggered the Civil War in 1860.

The European Union was initially conceived in the aftermath of the bloodbath of the Second World War with the aim of the ‘definitive abolition of division of Europe into national, sovereign states’, in the words of Altiero Spinelli, one of its Founding Fathers. Since then, the EU has been following several steps which mirror the historical process of building the United States of America.

The EU has greatly expanded its powers over time. It has approved thousands of regulations which are directly binding on all the European citizens, as well as high numbers of directives which are confirmed by the state parliaments. The European Court of Justice early affirmed the primacy of European Union law over the law of the member states; when there is conflict between them, the European law prevails and the norms of national law, including the constitutions of member states, have to be set aside. The Treaty of Lisbon, enforced since 2009, confirmed that ‘the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States’.

In the EU’s multi-level structure of governance, nobody is actually sovereign anymore: neither the traditional states, which are ‘member’ states of the Union, are deprived of competence on important policy issues, and are submitted to the primacy of European law, nor any local or regional government that might claim such an ambition. The member states of the EU have pooled powers derived from their previous sovereignties, but they have not created a new European sovereignty either. The citizens of Europe live under multiple jurisdictions of different scopes and breadths.

In the written constitutions of ten EU member states, the word ‘sovereignty’ is not even mentioned (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden). Rhetorical references to the sovereignty of ‘the people’ are made, as a simple synonym of democracy, in seven states (Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal). The sovereignty of the ‘nation’ is affirmed in only five countries and that of the ‘state’ in another four (Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Romania and Spain for the former, and Ireland, Malta, Poland and Slovakia for the latter).

Lending further support to EU power, the Constitution of Ireland asserts that: ‘No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the European Union or of the Communities.’ The Constitution of Slovenia, which is a more recent democracy that aimed from the beginning to become a member of the EU and took the issue as a leitmotif, proclaims no less than eight times that the republic will ‘transfer the exercise of sovereign rights to international organizations’.

The notion of sovereignty is also alien to many other countries. In the constitutions of Commonwealth members such as Australia, Canada, Jamaica or New Zealand, the words ‘sovereign’ or ‘sovereignty’ are not even written.

These examples could provide new inspiration to move further on towards – to paraphrase Spinelli – the definitive abolition of division of the world into national, sovereign states.

An effective democracy requires multiple governments

All formulas for democratic governance are hybrids with different combinations of direct participation, representative elections and expert rule, which imply different degrees of openness, transparency and accountability. Even in a town hall assembly a few advisors, officers or councillors prepare the discussion and shape how the issues are going to be debated, while political parties remain on the side.

At the state level, parliaments, governments and presidencies are formed on the basis of partisan elections, while the members of the judiciary, most officers in the administration, the rulers of the central banks and specialised agencies are usually selected by non-elective means. In international or global organisations, the assemblies and councils representing elected (and non-elected) governments of the member countries are replicated with boards formed by highly-qualified professionals who need proven experience and pass demanding tests to get their jobs.

All these formulas tend to complement each other at the different governance levels. Representative governments enrich their background with people’s direct participation in consultative or advisory events. Global institutions mostly ruled by experts heavily rely their legitimacy on the participation of national democratic governments.

Would be a good or bad way of governing your country?

Figure 1: Support for direct democracy, representative government and rule by experts

Note: Percentages are global medians based on 38 countries.

Source: Pew Research Center 2017, Global Attitudes Survey, Q29a-e.

There is broad popular support for these different formulas of government across the world, in contrast with broad rejections of personalist and military dictatorships, as reported by a Global Attitudes Survey by the Pew Research Center summarised in the Figure.

Yet the smaller the community, the higher the opportunities are for direct democracy. The broader the public, the more important elections of representatives are. And the more complex the issue, the more influential the role of unelected specialists selected for their expertise tends to be.

Summary notes

For democracy in the present day, there is not a single institutional master key able to open all doors. On public affairs, one size does not fit all. The assumption that it does was, and still is, the main mistake implied in the modern notion of national state sovereignty, by which the performance of democracy in the current world is strongly wounded. Recent economic, technological and human developments are promoting critical revisions of the issues allocated to each level of government and a major restructuring of democratic regimes.

This text is adapted from the book by Josep M Colomer and Ashley L Beale, Democracy and Globalization: Anger, Fear, and Hope. New York: Routledge, 2020. Online: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003027492

Literature

Colomer, Josep M, How Global Institutions Rule de World. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Online: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137475084

Colomer, Josep M, Strategic Transitions. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, 33–36.

Colomer, Josep M, ‘Transition by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way’. American Political Science Review 85, no 4 (1991), 1283–1302. Online: https://doi.org/10.2307/1963946

Jerzy J. Wiatr

National Security in an Unsafe World – A Central European Perspective

Central Europe is a political, rather than a geographical, concept. It emerged a hundred years ago, in the aftermath of the First World War, which resulted in the collapse of two multi-national empires (the Russian and Austro–Hungarian) and in the emergence of several independent states (Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland) as well as the incorporation of Croatia and Slovenia in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, which in 1929 became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Austria and Hungary – two nation states established on the ruins of the Hapsburg Empire – suffered the consequences of defeat. In case of Hungary, the consequence of the Trianon Treaty was the separation of about one-third of ethnic Hungarians from the new Hungarian state. In case of Austria, the defeat meant the return to the century-old dilemma of her place in the broader community of German-speaking nations. All Central European states were exposed to the consequences of the rivalry between regional powers – Germany and the Soviet Union – and were too weak to protect their independence by their means alone. Local conflicts over territorial issues (such as Polish–Lithuanian, Polish–Czechoslovak, Hungarian–Romanian) made the political and military alliances of the Central European states impossible. Some of them – Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania – based their security strategies on alliance with France. Such strategy failed, mostly because of the dominant pacifist sentiments in France and Great Britain, which led to the policy of appeasement with Nazi Germany.

The Second World War turned Central Europe into the Soviet sphere of hegemony – both because of the military situation and due to the decisions made by the victorious power at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945. The imposition of Soviet hegemony constituted one of the reasons for prolonged conflict with democratic states of the West, but not the main reason, as suggested by some historians of this period.[1] The United States and Great Britain were ready to abandon Central Europe to the Soviet Union, but decided to stand up to the further attempt to expand the Soviet sphere of influence (in Greece, West Berlin, Korea). For forty-five years, Central Europe became the dependent part of the Soviet bloc. During this period two states in the Balkans – Yugoslavia and Albania – were able to free themselves from the Soviet hegemony, both remaining Communist dictatorships. In Central Europe, however, the Soviet hegemony remained intact until the emergence of the reformist leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. Previous attempt to democratisation were put down by the Soviet armed forces (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968) or paralysed by the threat of such intervention (Poland 1981). Central Europe had to pay for the international arrangement that brought peace, but not freedom, to the European continent.

The peaceful transition from Communist regimes to democracy began thirty years ago in Central Europe and resulted in the total transformation of the geopolitical situation of this region. Central European states not only changed their internal regimes but also liberated themselves from the Soviet tutelage – the change made possible only because the Soviet Union was in the process of deep internal change, which in 1991 resulted in its dissolution. Historians of this period stress the crucial role played by the last Soviet leader, whose strategy of building ‘a common European home’ opened the door for peaceful change in Central Europe.[2] Twenty-five years ago, in the aftermath of the cold war and after the fall of Communist regimes in Europe, perception of the security situation in Europe was dominated by optimism.[3] Most of us believed that the century-old history of wars and hostility has come to its end. Such optimism was based on three main arguments:

The perspective of the world dominated by the United States led to the belief that the American leadership would lead to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and to the gradual expansion (by peaceful means) of liberal-democratic values. Pax Americana was seen as the fundamentally better alternative to ideological confrontation and to the conflicts based on national egoisms.

The peaceful transformation of the political climate in Europe, symbolised by the reconciliation between former enemies (German–French reconciliation followed by the German–Polish reconciliation) created hopes for friendly relations between former enemies. Considering the long and tragic history of the Polish–German conflict, such reconciliation was indeed a miracle.[4]

The disappearance of the ideological superpower – USSR – and the change of regime in Russia, as well as the weakening of her international position, were seen as guarantees of new, friendly relations between European nations.

In the following years the extension of NATO and of the European Union provided the Central European region with unprecedented feeling of security. Even the ethnic wars in former Yugoslavia have not weakened such atmosphere of security, partly because the NATO intervention in these military conflicts (in Bosnia–Herzegovina and in Kosovo) put an end to the war phases of these confrontations. In the Central European region, the system transformation was a peaceful process, including the ‘velvet divorce’ which marked the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.

Only few authors argued for caution and challenged the prevailing optimism. One of them was the prominent Israeli political scientist and diplomat (and my good friend of many years) Shlomo Avineri. In an essay on Eastern Europe, Avineri warned about the possibility of a ‘return to history’, by which he meant the heritage of authoritarianism and nationalism in East-Central Europe.[5] The other was Samuel P Huntington who – in his famous book on ‘three waves of democratization’ – warned about the possibility of a ‘reverse wave’ caused by ‘authoritarian nationalism’, ‘religious fundamentalism’, ‘oligarchic authoritarianism’ and/or ‘populist dictatorships’.[6]

The most radical versions of such scenarios have not materialised – at least for the time being. In post-cold war East-Central Europe no democratic regime has been overthrown by force and no dictatorship has been established. While recent developments in Hungary and Poland lead many of us to the critical evaluation of the ‘new authoritarianism’,[7] they have not created dangers to peaceful relations between nations of our part of Europe.

Today, however, there are reasons to be concerned for the long-term implications of the political changes that took place in the early years of the 21st century. Four such changes are of greatest importance for the security situation of the nations of Central Europe (as well as for the others).

The first is the crisis of American leadership. It has been caused by the adoption of the highly ideological approach to American foreign policy, particularly during George W Bush’s presidency. The end of the cold war and the obvious success of the American strategy of containment led some American politicians to the ‘imperial delusions’ and to the belief that the American overwhelming military power would allow the United States to subordinate the whole world to the American hegemony.[8] In early February 2001, I attended the National Prayer Breakfast in Washington at which the newly elected president delivered his first important speech on the aims of American foreign policy. President Bush argued that it was God’s will to entrust the United States with the mission of promoting democracy all over the world and that he – as the president – considered his sacred duty to fulfil this mission. Rarely have I heard such clear declaration of the ideological nature of foreign policy. Soon after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the United States (with support of the United Kingdom and some other states, including Poland) launched a war against Iraq. The Iraqi war turned out to become a major debacle for American position in the world. It was. To use the terminology of an American writer, ‘a reckless response to terror’.[9] While militarily it was a fast success, politically it turned out to become a catastrophic defeat. Zbigniew Brzezinski has identified three main consequences of the war. First, it caused ‘calamitous damage to America’s global standing’ and ‘has discredited America’s global leadership’. Second, it ‘has been a geopolitical disaster’. Third, ‘it has increased the terrorist threat to the United States’.[10] It is mostly because of the Iraqi fiasco that Brzezinski called the Bush presidency ‘catastrophic’. The arrogance of the Bush presidency has become the favourite target of criticism among American political writers.[11] In the aftermath of the war, the weakening of the American leadership undermined the trust of other nations in the effectiveness of the alliance with the United States and encouraged some other states to take a more assertive stand in international relations. Brzezinski’s hope for a renewed American leadership were based on his expectation that the new president (to be elected in 2008) would be able to undo the consequences of the ‘disastrous’ policies of George W Bush. It is true that during the Obama presidency, the United States has not committed mistakes of such calibre as the Iraqi intervention, but it is also true that the new president was unable to overcome the long-term consequences of the policies of his predecessor. The election (in 2016) of Donald Trump opened a new period in American defence policy, marked by the high level of unpredictability.

The second factor, to some degree related to the first, is the growth of international terrorism. While not a new phenomenon, the terrorism of the present century became a qualitatively new factor in world politics. It is no longer limited to a single state (or region). It became truly international. Unlike the older version of terrorism, the present one does not concentrate on specific demands and aims at the total destruction of the West. It is motivated by religious fanaticism, which makes it particularly dangerous. No nation of the world can feel secure any more. Even the most aggressive policies directed against the terrorists have not been able to prevent the continuous repetition of terrorist acts.

It is largely because of the new strength of Muslim fanaticism that the democratic revolt against authoritarian regimes in the Arab countries failed to produce the fourth wave of democratisation. Consequences of the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 have been disappointing – contrary to the early assessments in the majority of Western media and academic circles – and have become the third factor in the worsening of political climate. With the exception of Tunisia, all Arab states affected by the upheavals either turned to renewed autocratic regimes (Egypt) or fell in the state of prolonged civil wars (Libya, Syria and Yemen). The civil war in Syria produced the emergence of the ‘Islamic State’, a terrorist stronghold for religious fanatics committed to the idea of the world caliphate. Because of support given to the two sides in the Syrian civil war, the United States and the Russian Federation find themselves in a precarious position with potentially dangerous consequences.

The fourth factor of the new international situation is the growing strength and assertiveness of the regional powers – China and Russia – challenging the world hegemony of the United States. The rapid growth of the economic and political strength of China came as a surprise to most of the experts on Chinese politics. Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, who predicted the growth of China as a world power, had not expected that it would be able to match American economic power earlier than in the middle of the 21st century.[12] From the perspective of Central Europe, it is the new role of the Russian Federation that causes concern. Before trying to address the question of the Russian challenge, I should like to stress the fact that there has been a direct link between the failure of American foreign policy and the growing assertiveness of the Russian Federation. The weakening of the American power encouraged Russia to challenge the world hegemony of the United States, particularly in the regions close to Russia and considered Russia’s ‘close neighbourhood’.

Crucial for the security of Central Europe is the role of the Russian Federation as the strongest regional power in close vicinity of the eastern frontiers of the European Union. Is Russia a real threat to our security? Is she likely to provoke a new war, as predicted by the former deputy chief of NATO forces British General Richard Shirreff in his newly published political fiction?[13] In his fictitious scenario, Russia invades Latvia and is finally defeated by the combined efforts of NATO and local Latvian partisan forces but the conflict remains confined to the Baltic area and do not escalate to the level of the third world war.

Serious discussion of the Russian challenge requires an understanding of the political transformation of Russia after the fall of the Communist regime and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Internally, the post-Soviet period of Russian history has been marked by the chaotic years of Boris Yeltsin presidency, defined by Klaus von Beyme as ‘anocracy’ – a combination of autocracy and anarchy,[14] and by the neo-authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin in the 21st century. The failure of democratic transformation had its roots both in the Russian political culture (including the heritage of the totalitarian dictatorship in the last century) and in the mistaken policy of the democratic West which refused to offer Russia badly needed economic assistance in the first years of its transition from Communist dictatorship. Putin’s rule has been marked by successful efforts to restore Russia’s position as great power. It is this aspect of his rule which, according to public opinion surveys, explains his strong popularity among Russian citizens.[15]

From the perspective of the Central European nations the crucial question is whether Russia of today constitutes a real danger to our security. I am convinced that she does not. In this, I oppose the dominant political narration in my own country. There are two main reasons for my position.

First, Russia is not an ideological power (like the former Soviet Union) and does not intend to export her political system and political philosophy to the rest of the world. Her national interest dictates the policy of regional hegemony within the geographically close vicinity of former Soviet republics and parts of Asia and Eastern Europe closest to the Russian borders but not in Central Europe, which has become part of the integrated transatlantic community.

Second, Russian leaders are well aware of the potentially disastrous consequences of attacking a member of NATO. Vladimir Putin is not an ideological fanatic but a pragmatic politician, carefully calculating his moves in world politics.[16] Only a lunatic would risk the war with NATO – the most powerful military alliance in world history.

Because of these two factors, I do not perceive Russia as a direct threat to the security of Central Europe. This does not mean, however, that conflicts with Russia can be excluded from our strategic thinking. It would be naïve to ignore the possibility of such conflicts, but it would also be wrong to exaggerate their impact on our security. Conflicts with Russia result from the competition over the future of those formerly Soviet republics which from the Russian point of view constitute the ‘near abroad’ of the Russian Federation and which are seen in the West as potential candidates for the extension of the economic and political structures of united Europe. Georgia in the Caucasus and Ukraine in Eastern Europe are the hottest point of such rivalry. Such conflicts, however, do not endanger the security of the Central European states, which are not and will not become parts of the potential Russian sphere of influence.

Recently, the Ukrainian crisis resulted in the deterioration of our relations with Russia not because of a direct danger to our security but because of the determination of the European Union to protect Ukrainian sovereignty endangered by the annexation of Crimea and by Russian-supported secession in the eastern provinces of Ukraine. To understand this conflict, one should go back to the precarious Russian–Ukrainian relations after the dissolution of the USSR. From the very beginning it was obvious that the ethnically Russian majority resented the incorporation of Crimea into Ukraine and wished its return to Russia.[17] Until the crisis of 2014, the Russian position on this issue was subordinated to the strategic consideration according to which close relations between two states were given preference to the interests and demands of the Crimean people. This has changed in early 2014, when the overthrown of the pro-Russian president Victor Yanukovich and the radical reorientation of Ukrainian foreign policy caused the Russian Government to abandon its cautious stand on the Crimean issue and to offer support (perhaps even encouragement) to the secessionists in the Donbas region. While NATO and the EU have had good reasons to offer political assistance to Ukraine and to oppose Russia on this particular issue, it would be a mistake to subordinate the totality of our relations with Russia to the resolution of the Ukrainian conflict. There are other important issues in which co-operation with the Russian Federation is vital for the security of Europe, including the solution to the civil war in Syria, the struggle against international terrorism and containing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Political realism tells us that conflicts between regional powers cannot be ruled out. In the world of today they result from national interests rather than from fundamentally hostile ideological commitments as it had been the case during the cold war. Conflicts of such nature should not, however, be seen as catastrophic. Moreover, I am convinced that the only way to the resolution of such conflicts (Ukrainian included) is through a compromise – not very likely in the nearest future, but inevitable in a longer perspective.

More difficult to deal with are two other challenges: international terrorism and the flow of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa. These two issues call for unity of the democratic states and for a serious rethinking of our global strategy.

International terrorism constitutes the most dangerous challenge to our security because by its very nature it makes compromise solutions impossible. Central Europe has not been targeted by international terrorists yet, but it would be a dangerous mistake to assume that this state of affairs will last forever. It is, therefore, imperative that we close ranks with our allies in Western Europe and in America to collectively stand up to this challenge. It is also essential that we seriously address the social and political roots of the problem, including the unresolved Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

European solidarity is also necessary for finding a realistic solution to the refugee issue. Unlimited admission of refugees from war-affected regions of the Middle East and Africa is not a realistic policy, because it inevitably would cause the continuous growth of the number of potential migrants. On the other hand, both from moral and from political reasons, it is wrong to wash our hands and to leave this issue exclusively to those states which have been directly affected by the influx of refugees. What is at issue is not only the fate of the refugees but the cohesion of the European Union.

What practical recommendations can we draw from this analysis? I should offer four suggestions.

First, maintain and strengthen the unity and solidarity of the community of democratic nations of Europe and North America. Stand up to all attempts to weaken the European integration and oppose the policies of national egoism and isolationism.

Second, follow the policy of compromise and avoid the temptation to impose our will on others. Keep in mind that compromise is not a capitulation. Avoid double-standards in evaluating policies of friends and adversaries.

Third, avoid subordination of our foreign policy to ideology, even if it would mean abandoning the dreams of a ‘crusade for democracy’. Keep in mind the dramatic consequences of the ideologically motivated war with Iraq as the crucial caveat for the future.

Fourth, deal realistically and collectively with the refugee problem and with international terrorism and be ready to undertake necessary burdens in solidarity with the rest of the community of democratic nations.

This will not make Central Europe immune from dangers which characterise the world of today. Security analysis is not a recipe for a utopia but an intellectual instrument for making our practical policies more effective.

Literature

Avineri, Shlomo, ‘The Return to History. The Breakup of the Soviet Union’. The Brookings Review 10, no 2 (1992), 30–33. Online: https://doi.org/10.2307/20080293

Bebler, Anton, ‘Crimea and the Ukrainian–Russian conflict’, in “Frozen conflicts” in Europe, ed. by Anton Bebler. Opladen–Berlin–Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2015, 189–207. Online: https://doi.org/10.3224/84740133

Beyme, Klaus von, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

Boggs, Carl, Imperial Delusions: American Militarism and Endless War. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2005.

Brown, Archie, The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard: America’s Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books, 1998.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower. New York: Basic Books, 2007.

Byrd, Robert C, Losing America: Confronting Reckless and Arrogant Presidency. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2005.

Evans, Alfred R, Power and Ideology: Vladimir Putin and the Russian Political System. University of Pittsburgh – Center for the Russian and East European Studies, 2008.

Herspring, Dale R, Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2008.

Holmes, Stephen, The Matador’s Cape: America’s Reckless Response to Terror. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Online: https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511509834

Huntington, Samuel P, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press – Norman, 1991.

Kramer, Mark and Vít Smetana (eds), Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain. The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989. Lanham: Lexington, 2014.

Larrabee, Stephen F, East European Security After the Cold War. Santa Monica: Rand, 1993.

Shestopal, Elena, New Trends in Russian Political Mentality. Lanham: Lexington, 2016.

Shirreff, Richard, War with Russia. An Urgent Warning from Senior Military Command. London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 2016.

Wiatr, Jerzy J, Polish–German Relations. The Miracle of Reconciliation. Opladen–Berlin–Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2014.

Wiatr, Jerzy J (ed.), New Authoritarianism: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century. Opladen–Berlin–Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2018.

Lia Maria Pop – Irina Michaela Pop

Xenophobia in 2020 Europe – A View on Xenophobic Political Parties

The article focuses on the presence of xenophobia in the public communication of European political parties after the 2019 European elections, as well as offers a set of tools for its objective exploration.

The questions answered by the research stem from the reassuring statement that European xenophobia is far from being as worrying as the Eurobarometer and national election results would suggest. According to the tested hypothesis, new tools may lead to different conclusions.

This set of tools consists of: a) xenophobia, which is designed for public communication; b) a matrix (Table 2), which provides a comprehensive picture of this social phenomenon; c) tools for describing, evaluating and ranking xenophobic political parties.

We believe that they are able to provide a more accurate image of xenophobia and provide a stronger foundation for the struggle against it in the political and communications spheres. They are an attempt to innovate research methods.

Applying these tools would ideally lead to a reduction in xenophobia supported by political parties in the EU; however, concerns about smaller parliamentary xenophobic parties should not be dismissed.

Introduction

The 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections did not confirm the worrying predictions of the Eurobarometer that European citizens were not interested in the EP electoral process, nor the dynamics of populist (xenophobic) voters. After the electoral process, political groups with xenophobic Manifestos did not gain power in the EP and the Commission.

The turnout was higher than in the previous two electoral processes. Comparing the turnouts of 2009, 2014 and 2019, it is clear that the 2019 turnout was ‘one of the highest’;[18] and it reversed the steadily declining trends in voters for the European Parliament elections. The facts confirmed the predictions of the above-mentioned Eurobarometer.

The election results did not confirm the catastrophic predictions about the presence of radical forces in the EP. On the contrary, they proved the voters’ political confidence in the major ‘political colours’: the blue of the European People’s Party, (EPP) and the red of the Socialists & Democrats (S&D). They brought a new force that was predicted in a limited way: Renew Europe. The appearance of more radical groups alongside the old was not confirmed.

Table 1: Political groups in the European Parliament 2019–2024

Political groups in the European Parliament in its 9th legislature

Number of seats in the constitutive session (751 MEPs)

Current – 2020 – number of seats after Brexit (705 MEPs)

EPP – Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)

182

187

S&D – Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament

154

146

Renew Europe – Renew Europe group

108

98

Greens/EFA – Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance

74

68

ID – Identity and Democracy

73

76

ECR – European Conservatives and Reformists Group

62

62

GUE/NGL – Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left

41

39

NI – Non-attached Members

57

29

Total

751

705

Source: compiled by the authors

Table 1 shows how the seats are distributed in the EP in its 9th legislature.

Comparing the current colours of the groups with those historically registered, it can be seen that no new colour arose. There were Far-Right Nationalists and Xenophobes in other legislatures as well.

Figure 1: Political groups in the European Parliament since the 1979 elections to 2019

Source: www.europe-politique.eu/parlement-europeen.htm

Figure 2: The political groups in the European Parliament 2019–2024 in the hemicycle

Source: www.europe-politique.eu/parlement-europeen.htm

Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3 show that a surprising political orientation received enough votes to play an important role in forming a governing coalition. It is the centrist group called Renew Europe (RE). Interpreting the figures with the traditional tools, we can conclude that the main political forces have to respond more coherently to the concerns and issues of the European citizens.

On the other hand, radicals certainly cannot form a political construct. The EP 2019 elections did not legitimise the xenophobes as the leaders in the European constructions. The implications of the growing support for the far-right group Identity and Democracy (ID) and the European Conservative and Reformist Group (ECR), however, should not be overlooked.

The traditional tools of analysis raise the question: Can the far-right coalition join forces to block decisions that require a qualified majority in the EP? The figures show that the ID in coalition with the ECR could not receive more than 138 votes. That is, radical and extremist parties, including those with clear xenophobic Manifestos, have not received enough electoral support to identify xenophobic tendencies at the level of EU policies.

Should the Europeans be concerned about these political discourses? The results are saying no. But, in the context of the Covid-19 crisis, is this the real answer?

Going back to the Eurobarometer’s predictions about the xenophobic outcome of the EP 2019 elections and the de facto results, we have to admit that there is an obvious difference between the predictions and reality.

It is true that in the three founding Members States of the United Europe – France, Germany and Italy – the xenophobic forces[19] received a concerning amount of electoral support. However, the public should not be alerted about xenophobia.

Despite the relatively reassuring results, the issue of the difference between the predictions and the results deserves attention. Some of the same questions still remain: ‘How to explain the above-mentioned difference?’, together with the issue of radicalisation of European voters: ‘Does radicalisation mean xenophobia?’. These questions need a new clarification on what xenophobia and its dangers are.

Simply put, the clarification is needed to: a) give clear content to the word xenophobia (or even better, to appeal to a concept of xenophobia, instead of taking the word for granted as an operational tool in measuring values, opinions, feelings, attitudes, behaviours at an individual, group, national/European level); b) to try to look at the electoral results not only in terms of making and breaking governments, but also in terms of threats for the social consensus on governability.

We hypothesise that more predictable results can be achieved with more accurate measurement tools. What is more, we are in favour of: a) a matrix in which xenophobia is largely explored, in a holistic approach; and b) the matrix of political xenophobia.

The concept of xenophobia

The word xenophobia, in most European languages, is a word composed of the two words ‘foreigner’ and ‘phobia’. They stem from the Greek words: xeno (ξένος)[20] meaning ‘foreign’, and from phobia (φοβία), meaning ‘fear’ or ‘disease’.

The term foreigner, as a noun, is a word frequently used in Romanian. Before Communism, traditionally, it had multiple meanings, usually having negative connotations. With Communism, the meaning of the word became polarised. Officially, foreigners were ‘exploitative capitalists, enemies of the working class’; informally, however, a stranger was someone who came from a better world, with a freer, easier and more abundant personal life. Many girls dreamed of marrying foreigners, and many did so only because they were foreigners. Many people risked their lives to flee abroad. After 1989, the major and almost exclusive meaning of the word remained positive. A stranger was someone who did not want the deprivations of Communism. Going abroad was a ‘must do’; knowing foreign languages – English and German in particular, has become a standard (knowing Japanese, Arabic, Chinese was for the very ambitious); studying abroad was an ideal.

Two notions that have become cultural concepts can be deduced from the origins of the term: foreignness and alienation. It is also used as a name: one of the most important Romanian historians is called Xeno-pol (Alexandru Xenopol, 1847–1920). In Romanian onomastics, the name Xenia is also used.

The notion of alienation in Romanian has the meaning of losing one’s identity, causing longing or pain. Alienation, derived from the Marxist and existentialist concept, seems to be fading.

The term phobia is an academic term, introduced to the public under the influence of psychoanalysis and Freud. Popularly, the term phobia has the meaning of: horror, hatred of something. Alexandra Zărnescu after criticising the explanation of the word xenophobia in Romanian dictionaries, insists on its etymology and advocates for understanding xenophobia as a horror of strangers. Then – from a nationalist perspective – she denounces that a xenocracy has been installed in contemporary Romania with the intent to justify hatred towards foreigners.

The modern term ‘xenophobia’ was first used by Anatole France in the well-known battle for Dreyfus’s justice in the early 20th century. (The late invention of the term does not mean that hatred of foreigners did not exist before. It has been a very real phenomenon all over Europe.)

There are individual and social fears/phobias.[21] The case in which the whole society is sick[22] with fear of foreigners is a social phobia, and is the result of some political dynamics or/and manipulations. They end up in hatred, violence and crimes against foreigners.

The phenomenon, however, has roots in mythology. In ancient times, horror had its god: Phobos in Greek, the companion and son of Ares (god of war). A god of horror is taken over/met with by the Romans, with the name of Fear or Terror or Timor.

In the days of medieval Christianity, the fear of the invading alien is personified in the fear of the invasions of the Tartars. (Today, the horrors of war crimes are embodied in the fear of the Holocaust.)

Xenophobia could not be effectively stopped by the Christian principle of treating everybody like a loved one (‘Love your neighbour, like yourself!’). This vision was constantly confronted with a history of invasions and wars, throughout which a man had been a wolf to another man.

In conclusion, the word xenophobia, as it is known today, means: a) to be afraid of foreign enemies, barbarians, non-Christians, or even Christians (when they are different, schismatic, heretic, or reformers, as it happened in the open religious wars, or in the hidden ones; b) to face them.

A concept of xenophobia for public communication

Assuming a context

The concept of xenophobia is used today in the Romanian language with multiple meanings. Three of them seem the most relevant to us: 1. Political; 2. Legal; and 3. Cultural and media ones.

For the public communication, all of them are simply context. Public communication has to find a meaning that simultaneously includes relevant elements for exploring the political and legal fields, but also for the cultural ones. We do believe that only this way can the public be prepared to recognise and oppose: a) the xenophobic policies; b) serious xenophobic behaviour that can be condemned by criminal or civil law; c) cultural deviations that harass people and poison their relationships.

Political xenophobia is the result of those political actions of political agent(s)[23] that consist of publicly launched political discourses, theories, ideologies, projects, programs, actions meant to promote:

–fears from the Others, without any other reasons than the political interest in manipulating the public

–hate toward the Others, without any other reasons than political forgery

–incitements to deny the Other’s human dignity, to defame, to stigmatise them

–the treatment of Others as objects of exploitation, as merchandise,[24] or subjects of medical experiments

–the chasing, or mass destroying of Others

Usually, the above-mentioned theories, ideologies, projects, programs, actions, and so on, do not separate the acts committed by an individual belonging to a group from group actions, and transfer the responsibility for individual criminal acts to the entire group. Similarly, such theories do not take into account the possibility that some individuals of a criminalised group could be de bona fide.

When the political concept is codified – it takes the form of laws – it becomes a legal concept of xenophobia. This is the case, for example, with racial laws. (See more in Manifestations of Legally Condemned Xenophobia and the Nuremberg Laws on http://comxen.ro.)

The cultural concept of xenophobia encompasses all political and legal aspects of the phenomenon and its social dimensions, that is, horror, hatred and violence in the presence of foreigners accepted and developed as social normality.

When the phenomenon and the process are expressed culturally, artistically in works of art or in their equivalent, or when they are presented in formulas that imitate science, as a result of artistic form or pseudo-scientific forms, they strengthen and become a sustainable social reality. Consequently, they are also internalised by people who live in such an environment and become part of their psyche (that is, in their way of perceiving, thinking, feeling and wanting).

All these together become public opinions, ideas, ‘values’, attitudes, and behaviours. They become part of the public’s way of being, of relating to other people and expressing all this in the public sphere. As a result of this internalisation, it is difficult for the public to engage in critical analysis and very difficult to dislodge internalised xenophobia; to show them what their community would be like in a xenophobia-free environment; to show them that being comfortable with each other can only be achieved without phobias.

When all this is socially regarded as normal and ideal at the same time, the group pressure in favour of xenophobia will mobilise and the path of reconstruction will narrow down even more.

Like any notion circulating in public communication, the notion of xenophobia brings together fragments of scientific, pseudo-scientific, literary and religious concepts with popular meanings and fragments of deconstructions of commonplaces or prejudices about this phenomenon.

Nowadays, public communication is operating with multiple notions of xenophobia, some of them unarticulated and confusing. Among the articulated ones, two main political approaches have to be mentioned: identitarian and de-constructivist. They have the most influence on public opinion, on the casting of the ballot, and in the policies that rule our lives.

The first group, the identitarian (not openly assumed to be xenophobic) utilises xenophobic contents as a national or Christian tool for our identity’s defence. It is composed of borrowings from seducible philosophers’ approaches and by arguments developed in the philosophically sophisticated exposures, with popular interpretations, many times inspired by radical political movements and ideologies. They frame the complex reality we live in: a) the discomfort that the foreigners in our vicinity brought to us; b) the expenses that we have to pay for their presence; c) their dishonest intentions; d) their uncivilised manifestations in everyday life, and so on.

Assuming the contents

In its content, the European public sphere is attacked by the misty notion of xenophobia. It is a double mix. On the one hand, it combines the notes of the anti-xenophobia concept and the xenophobia concept. On the other hand, it melts the combination of populist items. (Such populist doctrines praise the superiority of autochthons, teaching them that they deserve more and more, but aliens hinder their greater status.)

Xenocracy is an obvious way to defend the political, economic and cultural power and to reject invaders. The invasion resulted in bringing us deprivation, poverty, injustice, cultural misfortune. Xenophobia is an irrational fear towards all/certain foreigners just because they are different and unknown.

Two effects are visible publicly: anti-xenocratic and xenophobic. Anti-xenocracy is a politico-military appeal to resists invaders, possibly to rebel against them when xenophobia is an irrational fear, which develops into irrational anger against the Others.

The populists’ tenets add revanchism based on our ‘natural’ sense of supremacy or superiority. It urges to ‘restore our pride’ and claim rights to be the ‘masters of the Others’. This behaviour results in not only the strengthening of the discomfort and risk, but also in lessening our level of empathy towards the people in distress, making us hostile towards them and distrusting them. According to the theory of the coup d’état, it is the time for instituting the dictatorship.

The second group, de-constructivists’ xenophobia is a political construct, mainly used electorally by the extremist parties. As content, xenophobia is revealed to be composed of false ideas, prejudices and stigma towards the Others, as well as of a phobia. The group alerts against the spreading of fear and hate in the global arena, considering that generalised hate is the main obstacle in creating peace and advantageous relationship among the nations. It looks that xenophobia as a social illness involves prejudice, contempt, horror and hostility towards certain foreigners. It also involves populist tenets when it refuses to notice some xenophobic realities that endanger world cohesiveness. It is when they do not accept the extremist Islamic groups – others than the well-known terrorist ones – as a group responsible for the xenophobia against us.

In brief, a concept of xenophobia for public communication is insisting on the fact that xenophobia is a social disease – a process of altering social environment with prejudice, horror, hatred, insecurity and violence, even extreme violence – which manifests itself towards some strangers, not towards all of them. Its deep roots are nurtured by fears and insecurity.

Xenophobia is not to be confused with xenocracy (the power of strangers over us), or the mobilisation against the invaders (anti-xenocracy). It is not to be opposed to xeno-philia (love of strangers). It is the hate towards a different kind of people.

Tools for the general understanding of xenophobia

Descriptive approach to intolerant and xenophobic values, opinions, ideas, attitudes and behaviours

There is a large portfolio of xenophobic and intolerant manifestations in contemporary European societies. The well-known, common victims can easily quote at least a dozen such manifestations committed against them by their ‘oppressors’. The ‘hosts’, at their turn, can quote similar acts, ideas, opinions offered by those they support. The radicals – in both groups – permanently provide new ones and enrich the portfolio with actions committed by the Others and denounce them as xenophobes. The voices for reconciliation are needed, but unheard.

To take into account the vastness of such a portfolio of xenophobic manifestations, we propose a double approach. Firstly, we invite you to look for the agents of such manifestations, and secondly, to their effective contents, taken as frequency and ratio in the total manifestations.

We propose to look at the agents of xenophobia as:

–individuals

–groups (political parties and their associations being the most important)

–nations/EU

We invite those interested to look at the contents of xenophobia, as references to Other/s in terms of Our: 1. values and valorisation; 2. opinions and ideas; 3. attitudes; 4. behaviours.

We create xenophobic situations (xenophobic contents) when we deny the Others’ values and, consequently, we despise the Others as human beings or their deeds (cultural accomplishments), norms, morals, as well as when we do not take into account their sacred values and taboos.

We show xenophobic tendencies when we claim Our absolute superiority and supremacy and proclaim their inferiority or barbarity; when we diminish the values of other cultures and do not consider their sacred values.

When we claim: ‘They are racially inferior!’; ‘They are cruel!’; ‘They are dirty!’; ‘Their religion is false!’; ‘Their rituals and interdictions are immoral, uncivilised, stupid!’. To sum up, when we attack their values, we are being xenophobic.

At the same time, when they attack our values they are being xenophobic as well. They must be stopped. They call for more xenophobia in society. They generate the xenophobia spiral.

We must assume part of the responsibility for their exacerbate retaliations, and for enrooting a xenophobia spiral.

They must assume the limits – and the requests – of Our culture when they try to live in such a culture. They must assume the responsibility for keeping it alive, in progress for the sake of their own wellbeing.

We create concerning xenophobic situations (xenophobic contents) when we do not make it clear for everybody from the very beginning that the philosophy of intolerance is intolerable in a culture of diversity and tolerance. We are wrong when we take the understanding of the principle of tolerance as granted. We are even arrogant when we assume that the Others quit their opinions and ideas (philosophies included), about their superiority and supremacy. The large majority inherited those from their cultures. When we ignore it, and pretend the Others abandoned those in favour of our own philosophies; when we ignore and distrust their culture and when we brutally call them to do the same, we pave the way for xenophobia.

In conclusion, we are responsible for xenophobic manifestations when we are hostile to the Others, when we treat them as enemies in a civil war that does not exist. But, similarly, they are xenophobic when they treat us as enemies in a civil war. Then they call for more xenophobia against them.

We must assume part of the responsibility for enrooting a xenophobia when we do not provide them access to our education system, to our perspective and failing not to tolerate intolerance. We must assume responsibility for xenophobia when we do not make clear that the principle of tolerance is not negotiable. We are responsible to let them follow the intolerant and exclusive commandments of their culture in a new milieu, to let them believe that they legitimately fight us back when we just call for tolerance and inclusion.

They must strive to accomplish the host culture’s philosophy of tolerance, just to strengthen their own welcome in our culture. They must assume the responsibility for keeping tolerance alive and in progress for the sake of their own wellbeing.

We create severe xenophobic situations (very severe xenophobic contents), when we present xenophobic attitudes as facts. We manifest xenophobic behaviour when we create, organise/support forces that persecute, exploit, chase, take measures to destroy them.

Synthetic approach to the intolerant and xenophobic values, opinions, ideas, attitudes and behaviours in society

All the above-mentioned components related in one single schema are available in Table 2.

Table 2: A matrix of xenophobia in contemporary democratic societies

Individual xenophobia

Group xenophobia

National or European xenophobia

Contents

Examples

Frequency and ratio

Contents

Frequency

and ratio

Content

N/

Fr&R

E/

Fr&R

Negation of their values and negative judgements against other/s

Claims such as ‘He/she came from a culture that is primitive; is barbarous, dangerous’.

Similar to column 2 and:

We deserve to decide about their fate.

Similar to the content of column 2 and 5 plus:

Our Nation/EU proved our superiority.

Expressing opinions and ideas against other/s publicly

They are lazy, brutal, villainous.

They came with intentions to invade us.

Similar to column 2, but supported in groups – tiny, medium, large[25]

Similar to column 2 and 4 but supported by the groups – mainly political parties large enough to get national/EU voice[26]

Taking attitudes and/or pressing for attitudes against other/s

Keep them away from us! Chase them!

Similar to the content of column 2 but supported in groups – tiny, medium, large[27]

Similar but supported institutionally by the State[28]

Behaviours against other/s

Transposing some or all the xenophobic attitudes into individual facts

Collective facts resulted from xenophobic attitudes

Institutional xenophobic facts (laws, institutions to chase, persecute, expel, eliminate Others)

Source: compiled by the authors

The requested contents in the columns about their frequency in a delimited interval and about their ratio that occur in a concrete society would give a fair picture of their significance.

The ratio could be only estimated by experts in sociology, or political strategists.[29] To understand xenophobia trends in a given society, the electoral successes of xenophobic parties are to be considered and they must be considered at least in three successive electoral processes.

The key notions in Table 2 are Other and Us. Special attention is to be paid to ‘who’ is designated as Other. Anytime and anywhere, somebody could be unexpectedly designed as Other.

Looking at the contents, we can learn that among the people unaware of what xenophobia is about, meeting people who come from (or are connected to) other countries or cultures, can provoke different reactions: ranging from deliberated ignorance and indifference to extreme violence.

Individuals, groups and nations who could become intolerant or xenophobic, or who have already developed such manifestations prove to be:

–ignorant to reality, problems and sufferings of foreign victims in serious situations; when they find out, they tend to self-excuse with the universal: ‘But I did not know!’

–readily making fun of foreigners, without concerns of the injuries and damages they cause

–ready to keep an unreasonable distance from Others

–ready to embrace the ideas that all Others, even those persecuted, are invaders and must be neutralised, rejected

When such reactions are institutionalised, the institutions enter the vicious circle of xenophobia, or in the xenophobia spiral, that leads to more and more xenophobia imposed on society, with less and less space for opposition and protests. In a society with institutionalised xenophobia, institutions act for:

–keeping the public ignorant about the Others’ condition and about reality

–isolating Others from the local people, in special camps, Bantustans, and so on, presented to the general public as ‘No-Go’ areas

–depriving them of much needed employment, medical, educational and social opportunities

–at times, ignoring their enslavement and exploitation by criminals

–Public institutions do not develop effectively:

–concerns for foreigners; victims of threats of violence and physical attacks (beatings, molestation, kidnappings, rapes, and so on)

–protection against human trafficking, crimes, or mass crimes against those called foreigners (Rwanda case)

It has to be underlined again that anti-xenocracy is not xenophobia. The movements of Gandhi or Mandela against the oppressors of their people could not be and is not categorised as xenophobic. Such movements were inspired by universal values and were oriented towards achieving freedom to all the oppressed. Gandhi, in his South Africa actions, fought against not only the expulsions, persecutions, discriminations of the Indian migrants, but he also embraced the cause of all the persecuted immigrants or natives exploited by the English and Dutch colonists in South Africa. Such movements did not ignore the cause of the most humiliated and persecuted people. Gandhi fought, back in India, for the ‘untouchables’, too.

Anti-xenocracy could become xenophobia. It does so when: a) the universal values are not on the horizon for freedom, or when such values are abandoned; b) when they militate against such values; c) when the aim of anti-xenocracy militants is only to replace the incumbents with themselves and to take revenge by persecuting their previous oppressors.

Special tools for recognising and ranking political parties’ xenophobia

A minimal internet research in English (“xenophobic parties in Europe”), brings up over 252,000 results. A similar quest done in French leads to 237,000 results. Even though many of the results are repeated several times, the number is scary either way. Europe seems to be in a darker age already. But is it the case? We try to rationally understand words, labels, stigmas; but they are far from fairly describing the real content. The meaning of a xenophobic party is automatically overlapped by the populist, radical, far-right terrorist groups. The key concept of being xenophobic is clearly unclarified in the overwhelming number of entries about it. More clarifications are needed, because such numbers instantly lead to label Europe as xenophobic. The minimal objections that Europe is not the Middle East do not come to the minds overwhelmed by numbers.

In order to try to bring some clarifications here, we have to: 1. introduce a simple differentiation (after their current political support) among parties labelled as xenophobic and alleged as major public dangers; 2. to make the criteria of the analysis that drives to their characterisations as xenophobic transparent; 3. to measure their degree of xenophobia and to provide a scale to indicate their degree of xenophobia.

Items in assessing political parties as xenophobic and a possibility of categorising them

Which are the items that could help the analysis of categorising a party as xenophobic?

Four features, each with two levels, characterise an absolutely xenophobic party:

1.a) open attacks on the universal values and human rights, or the abandonment of these; and b) the exacerbation of our identity’s values, legends and symbols; such parties expose these in their literature (philosophical and ideological writings), journals, sites, electoral Manifestos, political programs; legal and political proposals

2.political positions of constant attacks towards: a) democracy; and b) constant claims for their own supremacy as a race, nation, social group, and so on

3.the organisation: a) as a brotherhood; and b) total devotion and submission to the group leadership; it is impossible to criticise, challenge or replace, or even quit it

4.attached military/paramilitary forces:[30] a) are ready to punish the Others for their immoral, illegal, or intolerant deeds to set an example; b) are ready to accept missions of imposing terror

Starting from the pattern of a very xenophobic party, the parties with xenophobic features can be identified and even classified. We propose such a pattern in Table 3 with the aim of providing a tool for acknowledging the differences between such parties.

Table 3: Items in recognising the political parties’ degrees of xenophobia

Score of the ‘Colours’

(in points)

Assumed positions and peculiar organisational patterns

Peculiar tenets

2

Syncretical

Only recognised publicly as xenophobic, due to their names, alleged roots, or political opponents labelling them as such.

1 x 8 = 8

No to universality

No to the universal values, No to equality

2 x 8 = 16

No to Human Rights

3 x 8 = 24

No to democracy

No to inclusion, Yes to exclusion

4 x 8 = 32

Yes to our supremacy

Yes, to our Race’s, Nation’s, Language’s, Culture’s, Social Group’s supremacy

5 x 8 = 40

Monolithic organisation

Organisation ‘in the brotherhood system’ totally closed to Others

6 x 8 = 48

Organisation in total submission to the leader

7 x 8 = 56

Militarised groups attached

Paramilitary forces ready to become executioners

8 x 8 = 64

Total points

300

Military and Militia forces ready to become executioners

Source: compiled by the authors

An absolutely xenophobic political party is one that totals a score close to 300, but not lower than 250 points.

An extremely xenophobic political party is one that totals a score between 249 and 200 points.

A very xenophobic party is one that totals a score between 199 and 150.

A xenophobic party is one that totals a score between 149 and 100.

A moderately xenophobic party is one that totals a score between 99 and 50.

A party with some xenophobic tendencies, but essentially non-xenophobic is one that totals a score between 49–3.

A label that claims that a party is xenophobic indicates a party that totals only 2 points for xenophobia. They are due only to the label.

Table 4: Scale to assess political parties according to their degree of xenophobia

Totally xenophobic

Extremely xenophobic party

Very xenophobic party

Xenophobic party

Moderately xenophobic party

Party with some xenophobic tendencies

Falsely labelled as xenophobic

300–250

Xenophobic points

249–200 Xenophobic points

199–150 Xenophobic points

149–100 Xenophobic points

99–50 Xenophobic points

49–3 Xenophobic points

2 points maximum

Source: compiled by the authors

Ranking xenophobic political parties on the basis of their political position and of social peril

The categorisation of political parties (in general) is making it obvious that some of them are in power as Executives (at the Government); others are in power as part of the Legislative; others are out of power as non-parliamentary parties, but with some opportunities to come to such positions, and others are simply peripheral and ephemeral, with extremely limited chances to get to the legislative. Using such categorisation for political parties taken as xenophobic (and their ability to generate public danger of xenophobia), results in a general matrix of the xenophobic political parties and their ability to incite more xenophobia in Europe.

Rank I. Xenophobic Parliamentarian-Major, Infrequent Parties (from the EU’s values’ perspective), in Executive.

Rank II. Xenophobic Parliamentarian-Minor, Infrequent Parties (from the EU’s values’ perspective), in Executive.

Rank III. Xenophobic Parliamentarian-Major, Infrequent Parties (from the EU’s values’ perspective), with large support at a national and European level, but institutionally controlled and blocked in their attempts to generate xenophobia in the region/country and the EU at large.

Rank IV. Xenophobic Parliamentarian-Minor, Infrequent Parties (from the EU’s values’ perspective), with some support even at a national and European level, but isolated in Parliament and controlled institutionally not to generate radical and xenophobic programs.

Rank V. Xenophobic Non-Parliamentarian Minor Parties – out of the EU Legislative – with some representation in the national, regional legislatives, or local decisional bodies. They are parties without the capacity to produce concern for exploding public xenophobia, anti-immigration and harsh persecutions towards Others.

Rank VI. Xenophobic Non-Parliamentarian Peripheral Parties – out of the EP, out of national and regional legislatives – with some representation in the local decisional bodies. They are parties without significant popular support, which are prompted to, but out of capacity, to cause concerns for inciting public xenophobia, anti-immigration and harsh persecutions towards Others.

Table 5: Political parties’ xenophobic ranks according to their capacity to cause harm in society

Rank

Political position

Examples

Xenophobic parliamentary parties

1.

Rank I

Major, Infrequent[31] Parties, in the Executive

Not identified in Europe

2.

Rank II

Minor, Infrequent Parties, in the Executive

See the map of James Mayfield/GeoCurrents

(Figure 3) for the 2013 political xenophobia in Europe. In 2019–2020 xenophobia is significantly decreasing.

A possible example is in

Lithuania: Order and Justice Party

3.

Rank III

Major, Infrequent Parties – with large support at a national and European level, but institutionally controlled and blocked not to generate xenophobia in the EU.

Italy: La Lega (lead by Matteo Salvini)

4.

Rank IV

Xenophobic Parliamentarian-Minor, Infrequent Parties, with some support even at a national and European level, but isolated in Parliament and controlled institutionally not to generate radical and xenophobic programs.

The Netherlands: The Liberty Party (lead by Geert Wilder)

Non-parliamentary parties at the EU level

5

Rank V

Minor Parties – out of the EU Legislative, EP – with some representation in the national, regional legislatives or local decisional bodies.

Portugal: Chega (Enough) of Andre Ventura won 1 seat in the current National Parliament

6

Rank VI

Peripheral parties, out of the EP, out of National and regional legislatives – with some representation in the local decisional bodies.

Poland: Party of Lesek Bubel, National Party (SN) and the National Revival of Poland (NoP) of Adam Gmurcsyk

7.

Rank VII

Other parties, especially Minor Parties only labelled as xenophobic by their political opponents.

Source: compiled by the authors

Looking at the xenophobic points totalLed by a political party/alliance together with its rank, the perils for a social consensus and for an inclusive Europe can be more accurately predicted.

We believe that a pattern to evaluate when a political party is xenophobic and when it can produce harm in society is useful. It is useful for politicians, journalists, civil society exponents, the public and political scientists alike. That is why we proposed the above tools. Of course, the experts’ critiques would improve them. The sociologists’ calibrations would give them measurable dimensions.

The instruments in action: Political parties’ xenophobia
and how they are seen in public communication

EU 2019–2020

Political parties’ xenophobia estimated with the concept provided and with the proposed tools. A simplified analysis directed by the orientations provided and conducted with the proposed tools offers the following view on the stage of xenophobia in Europe in 2020.

Xenophobic parties of Rank I: In the EU, we did not identify such parties. Among the world’s democracies, the position is illustrated by the Turkish governing party, Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its firm position against opposition, minorities and free speech, as well as with its populism and neo-Ottomanism.[32] Some of the parties in power, categorised as xenophobic by their political opponents are assumed by their European political families as frequentable parties of the right-wing groups.

Xenophobic EP Parties of Rank II: Xenophobic Parliamentarian-Minor, but Infrequent parties (from the EU’s values perspective), in the Executive is a category hardly to be identified in today’s EU, except for the Bulgarian Attaka.

Xenophobic EP Parties of Rank III: Xenophobic Parliamentarian-Major, but Infrequent parties (from the EU’s values perspective), in the Legislative is represented by La Lega, firstly.

In France, the National Rally assumed open attacks on Human Rights – anti-refugees stands mixed with anti-immigration positions and pro-nationalist approaches. Recently, the party made changes in its ideology and political programs. They changed the name The Front[33] National to National Rally; they transformed the previous slogan ‘France for the French People!’, to ‘France First!’. The National Rally assumed political positions of an anti-federal European Union, in favour of the Europe of Nations, and abandoned the plan of the Frexist program. (They gathered the ID group in the EP.) Comparatively, with its history, the party moderated its positions and moved towards the ideology of new-nationalism. At the current stage of research, we did not identify supremacist claims; neither brotherhoods or totalitarian organisations, nor military organisations are attached to their party. We estimate that in 2020 it totals around 150 xenophobic points, being in the middle of the scale of the xenophobic parties. Being out of the National Executive, their xenophobic capacity (to impose xenophobic policies and to seriously harm the society) is not major, but still concerning.

Xenophobic EP Parliamentarian-Infrequent Parties of Rank IV: They have support in some regions. The Alliance for Germany (AfD), which enjoys massive support in the regions of East Germany, is the most obvious example. (The AfD has some support, even at a national and European level. They gathered the ID group in the EP.) They are isolated (with other political mechanisms and major political parties’ positions, which regard AfP as infrequent), because of their radical and xenophobic programs. They are prompted in a political capacity to cause concerns for inciting xenophobia, anti-immigration and harsh persecutions towards Others. We estimate that in 2019–2020, each of them totals more than 150 xenophobic points. Not having any chance to access the National Executive, their capacity to impose xenophobic policies and to harm society is minor. At the regional level, where they have substantial electoral support, concerns on their capacity to destroy the social consensus are to be taken seriously at the regional level.

Xenophobic Non-EP Parliamentarian Minor Parties of Rank V: They are, in many cases, out of national and regional executives. They mobilised some support and got into regional legislatives. They are political parties without the capacity to cause concern for inciting xenophobia or anti-immigration at a national and EU level, because they are minor and possibly easy to be blocked in their xenophobic intentions by the major parties or other EU institutions. FPO (Austria) and Jobbik (Hungary) illustrated this category until the recent 2019 EU elections.

The European Panorama of Xenophobic political parties can be easily understood if we take a look at the maps (compelled in the current decade) provided below from reliable sources.

EU 2019–2020 – The decrease in electoral support for the political parties known as xenophobic and their capacity to destroy the current political consensus

The three maps below introduce serious alerts on an political xenophobia in the EU. Member States’ positions in the Council of European Union during the immigration crisis (2015–2018) confirmed it. The policy of sharing the burden of asylum seekers on a commonly agreed ratio/Member State failed and revealed the non-solidarity among the Member States and unexpected xenophobic views.

Reviewing the maps below helps to understand how public communication lets the public perceive xenophobia in the EU.

The two sources are not singular in alerting on an increasing number of xenophobic political parties in Europe after 2010. A historian from Stanford University, James Mayfield, posted in 2013 maps with xenophobic parties in the Executive in 2013 – as minor partner – Europe.[34]

Figure 3: 2013: map of xenophobic political parties in Europe

Source: https://assets.rbl.ms/18406880/980x.png

Figure 4: James Mayfield map of elected xenophobic parties in Europe

Source: compiled by the authors

Figure 5: 2013: map of xenophobic political parties in Europe provided by Le Monde diplomatique

Source: Philippe Rekacewicz, www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cartes/europeextreme

The myth attached to the image explains that the ‘Green colour refers to countries where the xenophobic party is in Executive. Grey means not in power. (It does not explain the meaning of the different shades of grey.)’

Currently, the xenophobic parties in power in those times (among the EU Member States) are not in power at a national level anymore. They do not influence the policies of the Council of the European Union anymore.

In Bulgaria, the Atakka Party, in alliance with the Union of Patriots, as a junior partner of Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria GERB, has been in power from 2017, but no member of the Cabinet was nominated by the party.

In Greece, the Golden Dawn, which had 18 seats out of 300 in the National Parliament, did not win any seats in the Parliament elected in 2019.

In Italy, La Lega is in perpetual Opposition and it is seen as an infrequent party.

In France, the National Rally is in Opposition and it is seen as an infrequent party, despite it moving slowly out of extremist positions.

In Portugal, the People’s Party of Portugal was falsely labelled as xenophobic. In 2014 it was a party in power in a Coalition Government. The Chega is the xenophobic party in Portugal.

In the Netherlands, the Party of Freedom (Geert Wilder) lost an important part of its electoral support. In 2014 it won 4 of the 26 apportioned seats in the EP; in 2019 it got only 1 seat out of 29.

A comparable dynamic is visible in almost all the Nordic Countries, as well as in the entire EU.

Taking the map of xenophobic parties case by case, completed by Mayfield, and comparing it with the 2020 EU Member States governments, the conclusion is the following: there are no similarities. There are not xenophobic parties in power at a national level, except the Attaka. There are less xenophobic parties in the EP.

Reviewing the entire situation of the xenophobic parties and their EP representation in comparison with the previous legislature it is to note that:

1.The parties of Rank VI remained peripheral.

2.The parties of Rank IV still receive support. They increased their representation in the EP. In this group, there are the Xenophobic Parliamentarian-Infrequent Parties FPO (Austria) or, AFP (Germany).

3.The parties of Rank III – Xenophobic EP Parliamentarian-Infrequent Parties receive substantial support to become seriously represented in the EP. (It is large compared to what they received in the previous legislature.)

Accordingly, a peripheral xenophobic party gathering some extremism is not concerning for now, at a European level. It is not concerning, because it is situated in the periphery of political confrontations, and in the periphery of public preferences. The parties like PEGIDA (with divisions in many EU states) is not concerning the EU policies in the current legislature. After 2015, it kept a low profile. However, in 2020, it is organising virtual marches of protests. What about the future? The analysts of the political culture in the EU Member States could provide serious predictions of its dynamic. For now, we rationally can expect to assist in its increasing as well as to its decreasing. The Nigel Farage party was extremely peripheral at the beginning, but like Brexit, it severely damaged the UK and the EU; Hitler’s party followed the same trajectory.

The parties of Rank IV – Xenophobic Parliamentarian-Infrequent minor Parties succeeded to increase their support even at a national and at European levels. They are still isolated because of their radical and xenophobic programs. But how long will they remain isolated? Or, how long will they get support?

The parties of Rank III – like the National Rally (France), or the Lega (Italy), they are favoured in the two of the oldest democracies in Europe. They triumphed, but with a little bit more moderate discourse. They are not anti-immigration, but anti-illegal immigration. Is this a sign of their tendencies moving towards the Centre of the political spectre and lowering their xenophobia?

Conclusions

The following four conclusions have to be underlined:

1.Public communication on the dynamic of xenophobia in Europe needs a conceptual framework and a holistic approach, hence why we proposed such instruments.

2.The concept of xenophobia, the matrix, the assessment scale meant to suggest a holistic approach that we proposed. We believe it could be useful for future research and, especially, for the policies’ designs. Naturally, they proved to be refinable after academic reviews and critics. By taking on a holistic approach, the dynamic of the public support for political parties is more predictable.

3.The tools that we proposed to capture the dimensions and the real social meaning of the political xenophobia seem to be more accurate predictors of public support for the xenophobic forces.

4.In public communication, xenophobia is contagious and vicious. Any step that is perceived as xenophobic is immediately followed by others, done by those that see themselves as targets or victims of the ‘first’ step. It becomes largely communicated as a dispute. In the dispute, xenophobia increases gradually. It expands in the explorations for resemblance, roots in other social phenomena with destructive potential, and more and more combatants. The circle is vicious and extremely difficult to break. What is even harder is to turn it into a virtuous one. Political xenophobia is even harder to be fought because it mobilises people, bring votes and seats. That is why we invite the experts to be mindful of the traps of xenophobic language, reports and so on.

Based on these conclusions, we invite the academia to get involved in spreading the FRA and ECRI Reports publicly on xenophobic manifestations, and to face hate speech early; to remind the public of the EU Strategies to limit racism and xenophobia under the EU Framework Directive.

Literature

Berman, Steven L, ‘Identity and Trauma’. Journal of Traumatic Stress Disorders and Treatment 5, no 2 (2016). Online: https://doi.org/10.4172/2324-8947.1000e108

Bernadac, Christian, Devil’s Doctors. Geneva: Ferni Publishing House, 1978.

Eurobarometer, ‘Closer to the Citizens, Closer to the Ballot’, April 2019. Online: www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/closer-to-the-citizens-closer-to-the-ballot

Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society. New York: Rinehart & Co.,1955.

Further literature

Basaglia Ongaro, F, ‘Esclusione/Integrazione’. Enciclopedia Einaudi, V. 1978, 747–764.
Baumgartl, Bernd and Adrian Favell (eds), New Xenophobia in Europe. London: Kluwer Law International, 1995.

Biale, David, Michael Galchinsky and Susannah Heschel (eds), Insider/Outsider: American Jews and Multiculturalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Online: http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft5199n9tq

Carp, Radu and Cristina Matiuța, (eds), 2019 European Elections. The EU Party Democracy and the Challenge of National Populism. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2020.

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted at 7 December 2000 at Nice. Official Journal of the European Communities C 364/5, 18 December 2000. Online: www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf

Coenders, Marcel, Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers, Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in Western and Eastern European Societies. Results from the European Social Survey 2002–2003. Vienna: Report 4 for the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.

Consiliul Europei, Comisia Europeană împotriva Rasismului și Intoleranței, (CERI), Recomandarea de Politică Generală Nr. 7 a ECRI privind Legislația Națională referitoare la combaterea Rasismului și a Discriminării Rasiale. Adoptată în 13 decembrie 2002 și amendată pe 7 decembrie 2017. Online: https://rm.coe.int/ecri-general-policy-recommendation -no-7-revised-on-national-legislatio/16808b5ab6

Crush, Jonathan and Sujata Ramachandran, ‘Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development’. Human Development Research Paper no 47 (2009). Online: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdrp_2009_47.pdf

Deardorff Miller, Sarah, ‘Xenophobia toward Refugees and Other Forced Migrants’. World Refugee Council Research Paper no 5 (2018). Online: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WRC%20Research%20Paper%20no.5.pdf

Domke, David, ‘Racial Cues and Political Ideology. An Examination of Associative Priming’. Communication Research 28 no 6 (2001), 772−801. Online: https://doi.org/10.1177/009365001028006003

Distasio, Madeline, ‘Why Localization Could Be the Key to Overcoming Xenophobia’. Borgen Magazine, 16 November 2016.

Dornel, Laurent, La France hostile. Socio-histoire de la xénophobie (1870–1914). Paris : Hachette Littératures, 2004.

EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Keynote address to the EU high-level group on combating racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance’, 16 October 2018. Online: http://fra.europa.eu/en/speech/2018/keynote-address-eu-high-level-group-combating -racism-xenophobia-and-other-forms

EU Commission, ‘The EU Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online’, 2016. Online: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online

FRA, ‘Fundamental Rights Report 2020: Equality, non-discrimination and racism’, 11 June 2020. Online: https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2020/fundamental-rights-report-2020

Gall, Lydia, ‘Hungary’s Xenophobic Anti-Migrant Campaign’. Human Rights Watch, 13 September 2016. Online: www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/13/hungarys-xenophobic-anti-migrant-campaign

Geschiere, Peter, The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Guterres, António, Forced Displacement and the Promise of Pluralism. 2014 Annual Pluralism Lecture, Canada, Ottawa, 29 May 2014. Online: www.unhcr.org/en-us/admin/hcspeeches/538d801d6/forceddisplacement-promise-pluralism-2014annual-pluralism-lecture-antonio.html

Goffman, Erving, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1963.

Horn, Heather, ‘Is Eastern Europe Any More Xenophobic Than Western Europe? Investigating a stereotype of the refugee crisis’. The Atlantic, 16 October 2015. Online: www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/xenophobia-easterneurope-refugees/410800/

ILO, IOM and OHCHR, International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia. Discussion Paper prepared by the ILO, IOM and OHCHR for the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. August 2001. Online: www.refworld.org/docid/49353b4d2.html

Kakissis, Joanna, ‘Hungary Has A Xenophobia Problem’. Parallels, 27 April 2018. Online: www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/04/27/602375067/hungary-has-a-xenophobia-problem

Kounalakis, Eleni, ‘Hungary’s Xenophobic Response’. The New York Times, 06 September 2015. Online: www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/opinion/hungarys-xenophobic-response.html

Lameiras Fernández, María, Yolanda Rodríguez Castro and José Sotelo Torrejón, ‘Sexism and Racism in a Spanish Sample of Secondary School Students’. Social Indicators Research 54, no 3 (2001), 309−328. Online: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010871706454

Landau, Loren B and E Tendayi Achiume, ‘What could be bad about a global campaign against xenophobia?’ The New Humanitarian, 19 September 2016. Online: www.irinnews.org/opinion/2016/09/19/what-could-be-bad-about-globalcampaign-against-xenophobia

Misago, Jean Pierre, Iriann Freemantle and Loren B Landau, ‘Protection from Xenophobia: An Evaluation of UNHCR’s Regional Office for Southern Africa’s Xenophobia Related Programmes’. UNHCR, February 2015. Online: www.unhcr.org/55cb153f9.pdf

Rulashe, Pumla, ‘UNHCR mulls solutions for refugees affected by xenophobia’. UNHCR, 26 May 2015. Online: www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2015/5/55647ddc6/unhcr-mulls-solutionsrefugees-affected-xenophobia.html

United Nations, ‘Racism, Xenophobia Increasing Globally, Experts Tell Third Committee, amid Calls for Laws to Combat Hate Speech, Concerns over Freedom of Expression. GA/SHC/4182, 01 November 2016. Online: www.un.org/press/en/2016/gashc4182.doc.htm

Yakushko, Oksana, ‘Xenophobia: Understanding the Roots and Consequences of Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants’. The Counseling Psychologist 37, no 1 (2009), 36–66. Online: https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000008316034

Antonello Biagini – Andrea Carteny

After the Fall of the Wall, ‘Ostalgia’: From Berlin to Budapest?

Introduction

Ostalgie (‘Ostalgia’) denotes a series of somewhat nostalgic meanings and perceptions of real socialism that lasted until 1989. It first emerged as a German phenomenon following the reunification of East Germany (the German Democratic Republic, GDR) and the German Federal Republic (GFR), and then took on distinctive national expressions during the transition to democracy and capitalism in the different countries that had exited specific communisms:[35] in Poland or Hungary, Ostalgia was characterised by references to social security and relative socialist prosperity; in other Eastern bloc states[36] – such as Romania, Albania and, partly, Bulgaria[37] – it translated into nostalgia for peculiar nationalistic and authoritarian forms which had been able to ensure a relative well-being and, above all, a period of peace that was then lost (as in the case of Yugoslavia, where ‘Yugonostalgia’ roughly coincides with the cult of Tito and ‘Titonostalgia’[38]), or a greater role within a larger nation that no longer exists (Czechoslovakia).

Much often, nostalgia for socialism developed ironic tones,[39] linked to a somewhat empathic selection of situations typical of the now lost socialist ‘golden age’, in contrast to the alienation and social dislocation inherent to the transition to free-market economy: in this sense, the identity reference to ‘Eastern Europe’[40] became associated with an East that, with the fall of communism, was reincorporated into the capitalist West.

As a result, in countries such as East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, characterised by the development of civil society and the presence of those middle classes that had played a leading role in the 1989 ‘velvet revolutions’, nostalgia for the socialist past took on the colour of survival, and even of a certain well-being which was ensured for everyone, in contrast with the sacrifices imposed by the transition process on a large part of the population in the 1990s. On the other hand, Ostalgia inevitably acquired the form of nostalgia for the Soviet Union in those countries that had experienced socialism under the direction of Moscow and its Communist Party (Russia, the Baltic and the Southern Caucasus states).

It is also possible to identify different forms of nostalgia: a restorative nostalgia, related to national memory and recalling the truth and tradition of a country’s socialist past; and a second type, ironic and ambivalent, defined as reflective nostalgia, which arises from social memory and adopts a critical approach to the experience of real socialism.[41] Therefore, through different semantic values, one can take into consideration two major phenomena: the cult of the ‘modernisation’ of communist paraphernalia – busts of Lenin, pins with the red star, military hats with Red Army emblems – which have become widespread on the stalls in Eastern Europe marketplaces; as well as the ‘monumentalisation’ of real socialism, which includes theme parks, public monuments, museum exhibitions.[42]

East Germany

As previously mentioned, the emergence of everyday East German symbols soon exploded in East Germany: the pickled gherkins from the Spree Forest came back on the market; the Sandmännchen (the Little Sandman that sent East German children to bed) reappeared in the evening television schedule; the Ampelmännchen (the little traffic light man, allegedly inspired by the profile of the East German leader Erich Honecker) repopulated the streets, as well as the Trabant, that is, the traditional socialist-made car (produced by VEB Sachsenring Automobilwerke Zwickau, in Saxony), which spread across Eastern Europe as a mechanical product capable of combining technology and resistance, and later became a universal symbol of retro cult taste.

Moreover, in recent years, the economic crisis has been the main reason for the melancholic recollection of the times of life security in the GDR, when the solidarity of the collectives was a major social factor. As such, observers have found this element to be closely linked to the call of Ostalgie.[43] The historical context is, of course, the categorical basis for understanding the collective feeling of nostalgia for the socialist past. In this regard, the historical approach has given rise to interesting interpretations, also for the field of transitology and the studies – not only historical, but also political, psychological, anthropological and, more generally, cultural – on the transition from real socialist regimes (single party and planned economy) to liberal democracy (multiparty and market economy).

An example is the perspective linking the processes of substantial Western colonisation in the East and the nostalgic reaction of a large part of the population that had lived under socialism.[44] In this vein, it is interesting to apply the orientalist paradigm developed by Edward Saïd,[45] from which would emerge a stereotyped image of the Ossi (the Oriental) in West Germany, which may easily become the representation that West Germans ‘really’ have of their Eastern compatriots. In any case, this frame can help grasp the self-perception of East Germans concerning the national conditions given by German reunification, a historical unicum in the post-communist horizon of Eastern Europe,[46] but also their consciousness to be the result of the Prussian ‘exceptionalism’, undoubtedly legacy in the character of that socialist regime.[47]

Such clichés soon took shape also in fiction and public communication, as well as in everyday life:[48] literature, art and film. This explains the success among the audience and the critique of Thomas Brussig’s novel Am kürzeren Ende der Sonnenallee [On the Shorter End of Sun Avenue] and the film Sonnenallee, directed by Leander Haußmann, both released in 1999; and the fortune of the well-known movie Good Bye, Lenin![49] which led ZDF television to launch the spectacle Ostalgie Show, watched by almost five million people and one third of East Germans.[50]

The inspiring principle behind nostalgia, therefore, is not so much a real desire for the restoration of real socialism, but rather a feeling associated with the previous – albeit relative – ‘social well-being’, as opposed to the severe sacrifices that have marked the post-communist era.[51] It is hence necessary to distinguish between Ostalgia as a social phenomenon – almost as a custom – and nostalgia for the communist past in a properly political sense. The first case includes various manifestations of social, cultural and even commercial nature. In Germany, for instance, Vita Cola, a drink that had been the GDR’s answer to the American Coca Cola myth, was brought back into the shops. Intriguingly, Vita Cola is currently the best-selling fizzy drink in some regions of the former GDR. Surprising as it may seem, nostalgia has indeed occupied a considerable share of the consumer market.[52]

This kind of nostalgia has a predominantly apolitical character, as it rather embodies a generational nostalgia for products and lifestyles that marked decades and then suddenly disappeared after 1989. Obviously, this social phenomenon rests, at least partly, on the existence of a purely political nostalgia, yet the two types of Ostalgie could hardly overlap. In fact, its political manifestations follow different paths and have different variants in different countries. It has already been pointed out that the GDR was a case in its own right, since it represented not only a state and a society, but also a regional identity, which was denied public legitimacy after the fall of the Wall. In this context, reunification has led to the annexation of East Germany to West Germany, not only from a political-administrative point of view, but also from an economic and cultural one.[53]

East German pride

The perception of a real otherness – if not subalternity – of the Ossis towards the Wessis does not fade even with the presence of politicians from the East in top national government positions, as in the case of Angela Merkel. Moreover, after the initial euphoria that followed the fall of the Wall, the citizens of the former GDR had to deal with many inauspicious phenomena. For many years, unemployment in the Eastern Länder, which was almost absent during the socialist era, was close to 20 per cent. This was accompanied by factory closures and the migration of many young people to Germany’s western regions.

If a few people regret the GDR in its entirety, it is also true that, in most instances, the change has not met expectations. This sentiment found expression in the success of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) that, despite receiving minimal support in the western regions, often reached around 30 per cent in parliamentary and administrative elections in the East. The PDS was a party whose instruments and leadership represented a sort of continuity with the GDR and the Socialist Unity Party (SED), which was its leading party. Nevertheless, the PDS had a reformed political platform, which not only rejected the idea of an impossible restoration of the GDR, but also made democracy and political and cultural pluralism its fundamental values.[54] The PDS’ trajectory illustrates to some extent the limits of a purely political Ostalgia.

Despite its excellent results in the eastern Länder, its political capacity was irremediably compromised by its inability to gather a substantial following in the West. This prompted its leaders to form a new political group, the Left (die Linke), together with left-wing elements in the West. The party, that was originally led by the former social-democratic leader Oskar Lafontaine, had to leave behind its image as a ‘nostalgic’ movement for the sake of becoming a national force. Since its formation in 2007, die Linke has remained a leading force on the German political scene, becoming the country’s third largest party after the two historical Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).

Although the Linke continues to gain the most support in the eastern part of the country, where it has often won local elections, it does not take on the traits of an Ostalgia phenomenon, but rather embodies a national, modern political proposal.[55] It has been argued that the GDR was a special case in the socialist camp, and this was not only due to its regional rather than national identity. Indeed, the GDR could boast economic indicators, lifestyles, and levels of prosperity then unknown in other eastern European countries. In addition, while the SED had authoritarian systems of government, the GDR did not have the kind of personalism and cult of personality that existed, for example, in the Romania of Nicolae Ceauşescu.

In broadening the analysis on the political dimension of Ostalgia, it is appropriate to draw some guidelines that provide essential data for interpretation. Political nostalgia for communism is more widespread in function of concrete factors, namely pre-existent conditions of material well-being and decent lifestyles in the socialist past, in the face of the improvements and/or worsening occurred after 1989. In other words, political hostility is somewhat the result of the gap between before and after. The more decent the living conditions were before 1989, the more fertile the nostalgic feeling will be. The more the living conditions have improved since 1989, the less tendency there will be to look back. In spite of the monolithic image of communism during the Cold War years, the living conditions in the various countries were significantly different, both with regard to margins of freedom and socio-economic levels of prosperity.

The former socialist regimes in Eastern Europe had different levels of political, economic and cultural development, and this diversity inevitably conditioned both the application of the communist model and its concrete implementation in everyday life. In light of this, the concept of ‘communism’ is progressively gaining ground in historiography as a more suitable category to encompass the many realities experienced by the socialist countries.[56] The political, economic and cultural experiences of Eastern Europe states in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall are equally diverse.[57] While in some of them the overall assessment is largely positive, the scenario is more varied in other countries, where change was followed by the eruption of the economic crisis, unemployment, war and sometimes even the break-up of the country itself.[58]

Does Budapest feel “ostalgic”?

In a parallel and somewhat comparative consideration, it is interesting to examine the ostalgic phenomenon in other countries of the former Eastern Bloc such as Hungary, once known as ‘the happiest barrack’ in the communist camp. It must be premised that Hungary is among those former socialist countries in which elements and attitudes of Ostalgie, both individual and public, emerge only from a complex elaboration of the perception of the socialist past.

This is due to various causes, related not only to the different characteristics of the systems, but also to the distinctive historical reality that has characterised the Hungarian communist regime and then the transition to democracy and market economy.[59] With its well-defined national identity, Hungary has often harboured hostility towards the Slavic peoples, in general, and Russia, in particular, throughout history (think of the revolutionary epic of 1848–1849, which was ended by the Austrian troops with the help of the Croats and the external intervention of the tsar’s army). Furthermore, socialist Hungary was shaken in 1956 by an uprising involving reformist segments of the ruling party and a large part of the population. The aim was to change the country’s internal political order and to emphasise its full autonomy from Moscow, a goal that was epitomised in the proposal to leave the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet military intervention that followed left a vivid memory in the Hungarian population and, although Hungary never had the economic and political problems of Poland, this has meant that nostalgia for the communist past now refers to the regime of János Kádár – which was consolidated by the fierce repression of the revolution – and is therefore very much reduced in the public discourse. At present, the country is also experiencing a relatively stable period from the economic point of view, another factor that leads Hungarians to show few regrets for the past. From a political point of view, the last few years have witnessed the affirmation of nationalist political and cultural trends, which not only aim at preserving the ‘Hungarian specificity’ against the homogenising tendencies inherent to globalisation and membership of supranational bodies such as the European Union, but are also naturally inclined to consider the communist period an anti-national experience, imposed by Soviet tanks and not matured from within the Hungarian society. Yet, a deeper investigation yields significantly different results.

A survey revealed that most Hungarians have a rather positive opinion of the socialist era: in recent years there has also been a tendency among citizens to revive brands and styles from this historical period. This trend has had some success even among the younger generations, that not only have no direct experience of communism, but also grew up in the years immediately following the change, during which communism was described as a dark time.[60] The Hungarian identity, ethnic and cultural specificity is found, to some extent, in the memory of ‘goulash communism’ (Kadarism), a national socialism capable of producing irrational and ‘inauthentic’ results; yet, in spite of this, according to the ironic and somewhat nostalgic view of citizens, those were still ‘Hungarian times’.[61] In this context, nostalgia indicates a ‘cultural practice’,[62] an approach capable on the one hand of taking an ironic distance from realistic kitsch and socialist reality and, on the other hand, of re-evaluating in popular memory the simplicity of everyday life during socialism.[63]

It is thus worth distinguishing the nostalgia of the elder and younger population groups. Notwithstanding the lack of freedom, socialism is mourned by older people as a safe era, in which citizens were assured the minimum conditions of existence (education, health, housing and work). This reality exerts a growing aura on the elderly, who were among the first to be penalised by the socio-economic changes after 1989. On the other side, the youth do not have any concrete forms of political or ideological nostalgia. Here, Ostalgia is undoubtedly an aesthetic-commercial phenomenon, which empties symbols of their ideological content and reassesses them in their value of historical kitsch (as in the case of the setting and menu of the Budapest pizzeria Marxim, fully inspired by original real socialism). Then there is the process of ‘monumentalisation’ of socialist realism, as in the case of the Memento Park, namely the museum/statue park[64] of Hungarian socialism. This project, arisen from the need to preserve from dispersion and destruction some of the countless statues removed from public places in the weeks following the fall of the regime, was entrusted to the architect Ákos Eleöd after a public competition launched by the municipal council of Budapest.

The aim was to document the Hungarian Communist dictatorship through monumentality and socialist realism in order to raise awareness in the young Magyar democracy. The Memento Park was inaugurated on the second anniversary of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the country, on the 29th of June 1993, and enlarged in 2006 with a new section (a ‘witnesses’ space) on Stalinism and the 1956 revolution, bringing together 42 statues. The structure, clearly critical towards the regime, certifies both the awareness of the emotional distance from the socialist era and the success of Western capitalism in the Hungarian post-communist context.[65] However, it also exploits unconcealed nostalgic references to the socialist period in Hungary, considered by a consolidated collective memory (and by a special exhibition) to be ‘the happiest bay of the communist lager’: here, therefore, ‘Red Star Tours’ are proposed to tourists, as well as a ride (or at least a photo) in a Trabant 601 (defined as ‘the dream car of the communist era’). In addition, cultural products, music and images of the communist period are on sale in the ‘Red Star Store’.[66]

Conclusions

The predilection for the socialist ‘old style’ in countries like Hungary tends to consider minor brands as ‘alternative’, perhaps well-known and familiar, because they belong to a common past, to the detriment of the omnipresence of American and Western brands. Yet, there is also a nostalgia for a time when these countries had, despite everything, their own definite national identity, immediately recognisable in flavours and clothing. The latter trend has political overtones, but rather than representing ideological nostalgia for communism, it shows a reaction to the disorientation experienced by the youngest generations in an era of great uncertainty, where the identity of entire populations is challenged by market dynamics, even more than by political crises. In this sense, Ostalgia is a particular expression of a broader phenomenon, which for the past two decades has been producing in all regions of the world a sort of desire to return to one’s origins, and manifests itself in more or less radical forms of identity withdrawal. Apart from the older generations, where one can still find a political-ideological value in nostalgia for socialism, the ostalgic echoes and references are of an aesthetic nature, based on the ability to project everyday symbols and objects of socialist kitsch into post-modern elements of ‘communism-chic’.[67]

Literature

Biagini, Antonello, Preface, in Comunismo e comunismi: il modello romeno, ed. by Gheorghe Mândrescu and Giordano Altarozzi. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Accent, 2005.

Biagini, Antonello, Storia dell’Ungheria contemporanea. Milano: Bompiani, 2006.

Biagini, Antonello and Andrea Carteny, ‘Ostalgia: dal modello tedesco-orientale ai casi polacco e ungherese’. Costellazioni 3, no 3 (2017), 89–108.

Biagini, Antonello and Francesco Guida, Mezzo secolo di socialismo reale: l’Europa centro-orientale dal secondo conflitto mondiale all’era postcomunista. Turin: Giappichelli, 1997.

Biray, Kurt, ‘Communist Nostalgia in Eastern Europe: Longing for the past’. Open Democracy, 10 November 2015.

Boyer, Dominic, ‘From Algos to Autonomos: Nostalgic Eastern Europe as Postimperial Mania’, in Post-communist Nostalgia, ed. by Maria Todorova and Zsuzsa Gille. New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010. Online: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt9qd8t4.5

Boym, Svetlana, The Future of Nostalgia. New York: Basic Books, 2001.

Cooke, Paul, Representing East Germany since Unification: From Colonization to Nostalgia. New York: Berg Publishers, 2005. Online: https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350214811

Fornaro, Pasquale, Ungheria. Milano: Unicopli, 2006.

Ghodsee, Kristen, ‘Red Nostalgia? Communism, Women’s Emancipation, and Economic Transformation in Bulgaria’. L’Homme Z.F.G. 15, no 1 (2004), 33–46.

Giacché, Vladimiro, Anschluss. L’annessione: l’unificazione della Germania e il futuro dell’Europa. Reggio Emilia: Imprimatur, 2016.

Gysi, Gregor, ‘Apology (critical) of the GDR’. Limes 5 (2009).

Hardin, G, ‘East Europe’s Communist Nostalgia’. The Washington Times, 11 August 2004.

Hutcheon, Linda, ‘Irony, Nostalgia and the Postmodern’, in Methods for the Study of Literature as Cultural Memory, ed. by Raymond Vervliet and Annemarie Estor. Brill: Leiden, 2000.

Kideckel, David A, ‘The Unmaking of an East-Central European Working Class’, in Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia, ed. by Chris M Hann. London: Routledge, 2002, 126–144. Online: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203428115-11

King, Charles, ‘Post-Postcommunism: Transition, Comparison and the End of “Eastern Europe”’. World Politics 53, no 1 (2000), 143–172. Online: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100009400

Müller, Fruzsina, ‘Retro Fashion, Nostalgia and National Consciousness: Success of a Revived Shoe Brand from Socialist Hungary’, in N/Osztalgia – Ways of Revisiting the Socialist Past, ed. by Isabella Willinger. Budapest–Berlin: Anthropolis–Rejs, 2007.

Nadkarni, Maya, The Death of Socialism and the Afterlife of its Monuments: Making and Marketing the Past in Budapest’s Statue Park Museum, in Contested Pasts. The Politics of Memory, ed. by Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone. London: Routledge, 2003. Online: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203391471-21

Nadkarni, Maya, ‘“But It’s Ours”: Nostalgia and the Politics of Authenticity in Post-socialist Hungary’, in Post-communist Nostalgia, ed. by Maria Todorova and Zsuzsa Gille. New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010, 190–214. Online: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt9qd8t4.15

‘Ostalghia – La nostalgia dell’Est’, La Storia siamo noi, 2014.

Rota, Andrea, ‘Ostalgic advertising texts. Una breve analisi semiotica’. Linguistica e Filologia 24 (2007), 137–152.

Saïd, Edward W, Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Schott, Ben, ‘Schott’s Vocab: Ostalgie’. The New York Times Blogs, 15 October 2009.

Slovenko, Karolina, ‘Post-communism Nostalgia in Poland. Nostalgia for Polish People’s Republic’. Change and Resistance, December 2006. Online: http://changeandresistance.blogspot.com/2006/12/post-communism-nostalgia-in-poland.html

Spinney, Russell, ‘Spinney on Cooke, ‘Representing East Germany since Unification: From Colonization to Nostalgia’.’ H-German, January 2017.

Stewart, Kathleen, ‘Nostalgia. A Polemic’. Cultural Anthropology 3, no 3 (1988), 227–241. Online: https://doi.org/10.1525/can.1988.3.3.02a00010

Todorova, Maria and Zsuzsa Gille (eds.), Post-communist Nostalgia. New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010.

Velikonja, Mitja, Titostalgia. A Study of Nostalgia for Josip Broz. Ljubljana: Mediawatch, 2008.

Whitcomb, Joshua H, ‘A Problematic ‘Modell’ for Success: East German Nostalgia and Identity in Modern Germany’s Attempt to Come-to-Terms with its DDR Past’. Of Life and History 2, Article 9 (2019). Online: https://crossworks.holycross.edu/oflifeandhistory/vol2/iss1/9

Yazıcıoğlu, Ümit, Von der SED zur “Die Linke” – Die Geschichte der PDS als gesamtdeutscher Partei. Basel: Tekman Verlag, 2012.

Further literature

Hann, Chris M (ed.), Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia. London: Routledge, 2002. Online: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203428115

Hodgkin, Katharine and Susannah Radstone (eds), Contested Pasts. The Politics of Memory. London: Routledge, 2003.

La Mantia, Cesare, Poland. Milano: Unicopli, 2006.

Mândrescu, Gheorghe and Giordano Altarozzi (eds), Comunismo e comunismi: il modello romeno. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Accent, 2005.

Ochman, Ewa, Post-Communist Poland – Contested Pasts and Future Identities. London – New York: Routledge, 2013. Online: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203550830

Vervliet, Raymond and Annemarie Estor (eds), Methods for the Study of Literature as Cultural Memory. Leiden: Brill, 2000.

Inmaculada Szmolka

A Theoretical and Methodological Proposal for Analysing the Effects of Political Change on Political Regimes

Introduction

Political change is one of the most important fields of study in Comparative Politics. In particular, the scholar interest has traditionally focused on democratisation processes and the breakdown of democratic regimes. Nevertheless, both processes do not cover all the possibilities of political change. Political transformations can occur, without affecting the democratic or authoritarian nature of the political regime, but increasing or decreasing the degree of authoritarianism or democracy. Therefore, it is essential to categorise the different pathways in which political change can take place and their consequences on the nature of the political regimes.

On the other hand, comparison requires a systematic approach. In this vein, a typology of political change and a methodological procedure to study political change processes can be useful for Comparative Area Studies (CAS), which focus on intra-, inter- and cross-area comparisons.[68] In particular, the aim of this chapter is to offer a theoretical and methodological framework for evaluating the consequences of political change in the nature of political regimes of the same or different regions.

Definition and typology of political change

The point of departure for our theoretical framework is that political change can and often does take different directions, not all of which necessarily have to lead to regime change.[69] As Morlino (2003) pointed out, political change is not a linear process and it does not produce the same results. Transitions may occur from authoritarianism toward democracy, but may also give rise to a reconfiguration of authoritarianism. Additionally, authoritarian rulers can undertake political reforms without democratic motivations. On many occasions, the political changes carried out by authoritarian leaders may have the Lampedusian purpose of reforming aspects of the political systems without changing the main regime structures substantially in order to obtain legitimacy and wider social support. On the other hand, democratic countries can make progress or setbacks on democracy, increasing or decreasing the quality of democracy.

In this vein, a broad concept of ‘political change’ is used in this chapter not only in the sense of democratisation, but also as an element in reshaping authoritarian and democratic regimes. Thus, political change is defined here as the transformations in a political regime that can affect their rules, institutions, power relations, actor behaviours, power relationships and/or political processes.

We consider different pathways in which political change can take place. Firstly, two general processes of political change are identified which imply regime change: democratisation (from authoritarianism to democracy) and autocratisation (from democracy to authoritarianism). Secondly, five specific processes of political change are also distinguished: three affecting democracies (democratic regression, democratic deepening and democratic consolidation); and two characterising authoritarianisms (political liberalisation and authoritarian progression). Rather than involving a change of political regime, these five processes may lead to changes in subtypes within democratic and authoritarian regimes (see Figure 1).

General processes

Democratisation. This entails the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime and, therefore, the replacement of one political regime with another. In the academic literature, opinions vary as to when the democratisation of an authoritarian regime occurs. Linz and Stepan[70] pointed out four requirements for democratisation: a sufficient agreement on procedures to produce an elected government; a government that comes to power as the direct result of a free and popular vote; the government’s de facto possession of the authority to generate new policies; and the fact that the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not de jure share power with other bodies such as the military, or with religious leaders. Other political scientists have argued that democratisation implies the accomplishment of Dahl’s (1989) requirements for polyarchy: the existence of elected officials and control over governmental decisions; regular, free and fair elections; universal adult suffrage; the right to stand for office; freedom of expression; access to alternative sources of information; the right to form and join independent associations; and guarantees for minorities. However, it is argued here that Dahl’s conditions and Linz and Stepan’s list, are insufficient. For example, in Tunisia, these conditions were met following the founding elections, which were held in 2011; however, it was not possible to use the term ‘democratisation’ until 2014, as a result of the approval of a new and consensual constitution. Thus, another prerequisite for democratisation is that a large majority of parties and of citizens accept the new common framework of social and political life.

On the other hand, it should be noted that democratisation can occur in countries in which democratic institutions have never existed or in others that have had democratic experiences in the past. These cases of ‘redemocratisation’ are, for example, those that occurred in some European countries after the Second World War (Germany, Italy) or in the 1970s (Spain), or in Latin America in the 1980s (Uruguay, Argentina, Chile).

Autocratisation. This is the opposite concept to democratisation; specifically, the evolution from a democratic to an authoritarian regime. The breakdown of democratic regimes can occur gradually by legal means because of an abusive exercise of power, a significant restriction of political competition and/or the limitation of political rights and civil liberties. Autocratisation can also be produced as a consequence of acts of violence, such as a coup d’état or war. Examples of breakdown of democratic regimes are those countries that Huntington[71] placed in the ‘counter-waves’ of democracy. On the other hand, according to Linz and Stepan,[72] the stability of democracies depends on three factors: legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness. Lührmann and Lindberg[73] provide an effective methodological tool to operationalise and empirically analyse the concept of autocratisation.

Particular processes of political change

Regarding the specific processes of political change, they affect democratic regimes as well as authoritarian regimes. These processes do not entail a change in the political regime but rather an alteration in the norms, structures or functioning of the political system that do not affect the consideration of the political regime as ‘democratic’ or ‘authoritarian’, although it may involve a change in the subcategories of democratic regimes (full democracies and defective democracies) and authoritarian (closed authoritarianisms and pluralist authoritarianisms).

Particular processes of political change affecting democracies

In democratic regimes, political regimes can experience:

Democratic regression. The concept of democratic regression[74] – also named ‘democratic backsliding’[75] – is applied to full democracies that regress to become defective democracies, without the loss of the substantive democratic core (competitive elections, effective political opposition, a legitimate government that is accountable for its actions, and guaranteed rights and freedoms for the majority). This situation may occur, for example, because of the debilitation of the democratic institutions from within the political system, the interference in political decision-making by non-accountable actors or through the limited impairment of citizens’ rights (whether political, ethnic or religious). Nevertheless, gradual democratic declines can provoke autocratisation if the situation persists and the political regime finally loses some of the requirements for ‘polyarchy’.

Democratic deepening. It refers to an improvement in the quality of a democratic regime.[76] Democratic deepening leads the transition from a defective democracy towards full democracy in which principles such as equality, representation and participation are guaranteed. This process is characteristic of countries that have recently installed a democratic regime and have improved their democratic practices, leading to full democracy first and then, if pursued, to the consolidation of democracy.

Democratic consolidation. This concept involves the anchoring of democratic values, institutions and practices, and therefore of the legitimacy of a democratic regime.[77] Therefore, it is a process that is developed over time, in the context of full democracies. Nevertheless, democratic consolidation is only one of the possible results after democratic installation. It is not easy to limit the moment when democratic consolidation takes place. For Huntington,[78] democratic consolidation occurs when there is alternation in the government after elections. Diamond[79] identifies the conditions that foster democratic consolidation. These include strong political institutions, appropriate institutional designs, decentralisation of power, a vibrant civil society, and improved economic and political performance.

Particular processes of political change affecting authoritarianisms

Political liberalisation. This process takes place in authoritarian contexts and is led by rulers in order to preserve the legitimacy of the regime. It implies an easing of repression and an extension of political rights and civil liberties, and thus, an increase in political competition and participation.[80] It may also involve a rotation of power. In a context of political liberalisation, the regime maintains its autocratic nature. Political liberalisation does not necessarily lead to the beginning of a transition towards democracy, and therefore does not necessarily trigger a change in political regime from authoritarian to democratic.[81] Nevertheless, it may involve a shift from a hegemonic authoritarian regime towards a quasi-competitive one, extending the degree of political competence and rights. If liberalisation is very limited or only normative, it will maintain the previous form of political authority (a quasi-competitive or hegemonic authoritarian regime).

Authoritarian progression. This means a deepening of the authoritarian nature of a regime. The authoritarian regime places even more limits on political competition and the exercise of political rights and civil liberties. It can occur in any category of authoritarian regime.

Figure 1: Political change processes between political regimes

Source: compiled by the author

Methodology for the study of political change processes

The analysis of political change processes in Comparative Area Studies demands a systematic approach that enables comparison among countries (intra-, inter- and cross-area comparisons). In this section a methodological framework for the study of political change is proposed. The aim is to provide a tool that may be useful in analysing and evaluating the scope of political transformations.

Bearing in mind that each process of change is configured in a different way, according to combinations of different variables (institutional, historical, economic cultural, social, and so on), we take into account the context in which the political process takes place together with the consequences of political change in the nature of political regimes, in particular, on pluralism and political competition, government and public rights and civil liberties.

Context of political change processes

Contextual and structural factors are important for a study of political change, not because they constitute prerequisites for democratisation but as elements that can facilitate or hinder democratic or authoritarian change.[82] Among these factors we can point out the following:

Historical legacies: democratic/authoritarian past; colonial past.

Socioeconomic factors: economic and social development.

Demographic factors: demographic structure, fragmentation and polarisation (religious and ethnic).

Institutional-political factors: characteristics of the regime (internal and external support, degree of institutionalisation and ideologisation), and of opposition to the authoritarian regime (opposition groups, organisation of the opposition in coalitions, unity of opposition and capacity for social mobilisation).

Political culture: citizen and elite values and attitudes towards democracy.

International factors: relation of dependence or interdependence on international markets and other countries, integration in regional or supranational organisations, international pressure for or against democratisation, degree of cultural globalisation.

Table 1: Context of political change processes

Dimension

Variables

Sub-variables

Suggested indicators/categorisation

Historical

Democratic/authoritarian legacy

Former experiences of democracy or authoritarianism

Colonial legacy

Colonial power/colony

Socioeconomic

Economic growth

GDP per capita growth (World Bank)

Social development

Equality/inequality

GINI index (World Bank)

Unemployment

Unemployment rate (total) (World Bank)

Youth unemployment rate (World Bank)

Education

Literacy rate (World Bank)

Secondary completion rate (World Bank)

Tertiary graduation rate (OECD)

Demographic

Demographic structure

Adult population

Population ages 15–64 (World Bank)

Fragmentation

Ethnic fragmentation

Ethnic fractionalization index

Religious fragmentation

Religious fractionalisation index

Polarization

Ethnic

Ethnic polarisation index

Religious

Religious fractionalisation index

Institutional-political

Political regime

Support

Endogenous support (political, economic and social support)

Exogenous support (international)

State institutionalisation

Strong/weak

Ideologisation

Strong/weak

Opposition

Opposition groups

Main organisations and types

Organisation

Platforms and coalitions

Unity

Fragmentation

Polarisation

Capacity of social mobilisation

Call for social and political protests

Cultural

Political culture

Democratic/authoritarian values and attitudes

In political elites

In citizenship (World Values Survey/area barometers)

International

Relationship of dependence or interdependence

Ratio of international trade flows to national income

Regional/supranational integration

Membership

Democratisation as prerequisite of membership

International pressure for democratisation

Yes/no

Cultural globalisation

Internet penetration

Individual using the Internet (World Bank)

Internet control by State

Yes/no

Source: compiled by the author

Consequences of political change on the nature of the political regimes

Political change is proposed here to be analysed with reference to the three key dimensions of the political regimes: pluralism, government, and public rights and liberties.

Pluralism and political competition. With regard to parties and party systems, political parties’ legal frameworks can be studied with the aim of identifying whether there has been an increase or decrease in political pluralism and whether the main societal cleavages are represented in the creation of parties. We can also observe political competitiveness in order to determine the existence of a hegemonic actor or rotation in power. Likewise, inter-party relations in the processes of change can be examined, bearing in mind the coalition structures and the shared or adversarial interests and strategies between parties. In relation to electoral integrity, researchers can assess achievements in the presidential and/or parliamentary elections through variables such as consensus in the electoral system and fairness, the degree to which elections allow de facto participation, competition and the expression of political preferences, the supervision and conduct of electoral processes, and the acceptance of the electoral results by political actors.

Government. Political change can influence the constitutional framework, government and state powers, and governance. Thus, firstly, it is convenient to analyse the procedures, the degree of consensus (or lack of it) in the constitutional processes, and the democratic or autocratic content of the new constitutions or constitutional reforms. Secondly, political change can have consequences on elections and the accountability of government; the concentration or distribution of power between institutions; the effectiveness with which the elected rulers are able to exercise power; and the state’s capacity to meet the needs of its citizens (responsiveness).[83] Thirdly, the effects of political change can be studied in relation to good governance: inclusiveness (equal treatment and equal access to public services), accountability (publication of budgets and public expenditure) and transparency (fighting corruption in the public sector).

Public rights and civil liberties. The changes introduced by the new legal frameworks for rights of citizenship, the degree of success achieved in their implementation, and the extent to which they represent a forward or a backward step for public rights and civil liberties can be examined. Secondly, the strengthening of the rule of law through observation of the independence of the judiciary, the implementation of transactional justice and respect for human rights can be considered. Finally, the evolution of civil society and the appearance of new social movements, the autonomy of civil society vis-à-vis the state, and the role of civil society in the process of political change – the ability to mount protest action and to participate in processes of political change – can be taken into account.

Table 2: Consequences of political change on the key dimensions of the political regimes

Dimension

Variables

Sub-Variables

Indicators

Pluralism and political competition

Political pluralism and representation

Legal framework

Increase/decrease in party supply

Social cleavages

Possibility of parties of all tendencies to participate in politics

Political competitiveness

Pluralism vs hegemony

Dominance/no dominance of an hegemonic party or coalition in politics

Political alternance

Rotation in power

Inter-party relations

Coalition structures

Unified opposition platforms

Democratic consensus

Democratic shared interests and strategies. Agreements between political forces

Electoral integrity

Freedom for voting

Universal right to vote

Electoral competence

Similar opportunities to run for office

Electoral system

Acceptation of electoral system by the majority of political forces

Fairness of election process

Mechanisms to guarantee fairness of elections (independent commissions for organising elections, international and/or national monitoring). No significant irregularities (vote-buying, intimidation, violence)

Social and political acceptance of electoral results

Significant turnout. Absence of political contestation of electoral results

Government

New constitutions and constitutional reforms

Procedure

Participation of majority political groups. Participation of citizenship (constitutional referendum)

Consensus/lack of consensus

Agreed or non-agreed constitutions

Content

Democratic/autocratic scope

Government and state powers

Government legitimacy

Democratic election

Accountable government

Separation of powers

System of check and balances between institutions

Effective power of government

Non-existence of veto players or reserved domains

Control of the territory and legitimate use of violence

Responsiveness

Correspondence of state to citizen needs and civil society in general

Governance

Inclusiveness

Equal treatment and access to public services

Accountability

Publication of budgets and public expenditure

Transparency

Measures against corruption

Public Rights and Civil Liberties

Rule of law

Independence of the judiciary

Increase in the autonomy of the judiciary

Transactional justice

Implementation and consensus on transactional justice

Human rights

Improvement in the situation of human rights

Public rights

Right of association

New legal measures and improvements or setbacks

Union rights

New legal measures and improvements or setbacks

Right of assembly and demonstration

New legal measures and improvements or setbacks

Civil liberties

Freedom of religious beliefs

New legal measures and improvements or setbacks

Freedom of speech and opinion

New legal measures and improvements or setbacks

Freedom of the press

New legal measures and improvements or setbacks

Civil society

Relation vis-à-vis the state

Dependence/independence of the state

Social mobilisation

Participation of social groups and citizens in processes of change

Source: compiled by the author

Conclusions

This chapter has offered a theoretical framework for evaluating the consequences of the processes of political change on the nature of political regimes from a comparative perspective. Even with similar starting points, whether in authoritarian or democratic regimes, political change can and often does take different directions, not all of which necessarily have to lead to a regime change. A regime might move from authoritarianism towards democracy, but the transition can also lead to a new form of authoritarianism. Therefore, with a typology of political regimes in mind, two general processes of political change have been identified: democratisation (from authoritarianism to democracy) and autocratisation (from democracy to authoritarianism). Furthermore, five specific processes of political change affecting democracies (democratic regression, democratic deepening and consolidation of democracy) or authoritarianisms (political liberalisation and authoritarian progression) have been identified.